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JURISDICTION 
By Order dated January 15, 1988, the Supreme Court of Utah 
transferred this consolidated appeal to this Court, pursuant to 
§ 78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
This consolidated appeal is from a Judgment entered on 
September 11, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Salt Lake County, by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District 
Judge. The judgment of no cause of action was in favor of 
defendant/respondent Forever Living Products, Inc., and against 
plaintiff/appellant Ronald K. Neilson d/b/a Marina Mechanics 
Enterprises and plaintiff-intervenor/appellant Astro Steel 
Corporation. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE £ 
Nature of the Case. 
This action was commenced by Ronald K. Neilson d/b/a Marina 
Mechanics (hereinafter "Neilson" or "Marina Mechanics"), a 
subcontractor on a marina construction project located in the 
Lake Mead National Recreation Area. The action was brought 
against the owner of the marina, Forever Living Products, Inc. 
(hereinafter "FLP") for amounts Marina Mechanics claimed it was 
owed for construction of the marina. Marina Mechanics' 
asserted six theories of recovery against FLP: (1) that FLP 
had been unjustly enriched by Marina Mechanics; (2) that Marina 
Mechanics was a third-party beneficiary under the terms of a 
lease entered into between FLP and the United States Department 
of the Interior; (3) that Marina Mechanics was a third-party 
beneficiary of a general construction contract entered into 
between FLP and Marinas Internationale, the general contractor 
for the marina construction; (4) that FLP made an oral promise 
to pay Marina Mechanics two hundred forty-nine thousand dollars 
nine hundred and ninety-four dollars and fifty-seven cents 
($249,994.57) allegedly owed Marina Mechanics by Marinas 
Internationale when Marinas Internationale filed for bank-
ruptcy; (5) that FLP was negligent in the manner in which it 
administered the general contract by not paying Marinas 
Internationale and its subcontractors with joint checks and by 
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not requiring Marinas Internationale to post a bond to protect 
the subcontractors; (6) that FLP tortiously interfered with the 
contract between Marina Mechanics and Marinas Internationale. 
Thereafter, plaintiff in intervention, Astro Steel 
Corporation (hereinafter "Astro" or "Astro Steel"), a material 
supplier, was allowed to file a Complaint in Intervention which 
basically restated the allegations of Marina Mechanics' 
Complaint. 
FLP's answers to the Complaint and the Complaint in 
Intervention denied that either Marina Mechanics or Astro Steel 
were entitled to any relief and raised various pertinent 
affirmative defenses. 
Course of Proceedings Below. 
This matter was tried to the court, the Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson, District Judge, presiding, on June 9-11, 16 and 
July 1, 1987. On June 16, 1987, after Marina Mechanics and 
Astro Steel rested, FLP moved for a dismissal of the action, 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) Utah R. Civ. P. Although the court made 
its ruling on that motion on June 16, 1987, (R. 000647, pp. 
3-11), the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: 
Defendants Motion for Involuntary Dismissal was not signed 
until October 9, 1987 (R. 000628-632) because it was misplaced 
-2-
by the clerk. Pursuant to the Rule 41(b) motion the court 
dismissed both Marina Mechanics' and Astro Steel's claims for 
interference with contractual relations, negligence and those 
based upon alleged oral promises or agreements. The court then 
took evidence and heard testimony from FLP regarding the unjust 
enrichment and the third-party beneficiary claims. On July 1, 
1987 the court granted judgment in favor of FLP and against 
Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel on those remaining claims. 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which relate 
only to the unjust enrichment and third-party beneficiary 
claims, were signed by the court on September 11, 1987. 
(Copies of both sets of findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are attached hereto as Addenda 1 and 2.) On that same day a 
Judgment in favor of FLP and against Marina Mechanics and Astro 
Steel was signed by the court. (R. 00617). (Copies of the 
transcripts of the court's rulings of June 16, 1987 and July 1, 
1987 are attached hereto as Addenda 3 and 4, respectively.) On 
October 6, 1987, the court signed an order granting Marina 
Mechanics a 30 day extension in which to file a notice of 
appeal in this matter (R. 000625). On October 9, 1987, Astro 
Steel filed a notice of appeal. (R. 000633). On November 9, 
1987, Marina Mechanics filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 000638). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 29, 1982, FLP entered into a Concessionaire's 
Lease with the United States of America, Department of the 
Interior, to act as a concessionaire on United States 
Government property. (R. 000607; see Addendum 2.) The purpose 
of this lease was to allow FLP to operate a marina located on 
Callville Bay in the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, within 
the State of Nevada. Shortly thereafter, FLP began to operate 
the marina that existed on Callville Bay. 
Although FLP, which is an Arizona corporation, is in the 
primary business of selling health related products made from 
the Aloe Vera plant, it also has a resorts division which owns 
resort properties such as marinas and hotels located in various 
places around the country. (R. 000662, pp. 122-123.) 
In July of 1984, a storm occurred on Callville Bay which 
damaged much of the existing marina and required extensive 
repairs and reconstruction. After the storm, FLP contracted 
with a Mr. Dick Reed and his company, Store Afloat, to perform 
the clean up of the debris. FLP was also in the process of 
working out a deal with Mr. Reed to have him perform the marina 
reconstruction when he was killed in a helicopter crash. (R. 
000662, p. 126.) 
Following Mr. Reed's death, FLP solicited and received bids 
from several other contractors for the marina reconstruction. 
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After conducting an investigation of the various contractors, 
FLP ultimately determined to hire Marina^ Internationale, of 
Herndon, Virginia, as the general contractor. Prior to making 
this determination, representatives of FLP met with the owners 
of, and visually inspected, several other marinas constructed 
by Marinas Internationale. They found the other owners to be 
very complimentary of Marinas Internationale's work. FLP's 
representatives were also impressed by the fact that some of 
Marinas Internationale's marinas had survived hurricanes. (R. 
000662, pp. 128-131.) 
Thereafter, on December 14, 1984, FLp entered into a 
general construction contract (Trial Exhibit D-40, copy 
attached hereto as Addendum 5) with Marinas Internationale for 
the construction of the new marina on Callville Bay. The base 
price for the construction of the marina, per the general 
contract, was $2,084,760. The general contract also contained 
a mechanism whereby Marinas Internationale was to be paid an 
additional amount for anchoring the dock system, based upon 
actual costs but not to exceed $101,740. (Trial Exhibit D-40, 
p. 7; see Addendum 5.) 
The general contract was basically a "turnkey" project, in 
other words, Marinas Internationale was to perform the total 
construction of the marina and turn the project over to FLP 
when the marina was ready for occupancy. (R. 000662, p. 131.) 
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The marina which was to be constructed by Marinas 
Internationale was an extensive boat docking system which 
included a main walkway running from the shore to the boat 
slips, or berths, six piers of which three were to be covered 
with a steel roof structure and a breakwater system to 
neutralize the waves coming off of the lake into Callville 
Bay. Overall the marina was to have approximately 320 new boat 
slips. The docking system was to be anchored by an underwater 
system composed of concrete blocks suspended on cables attached 
to the dock. (R. 000660, pp. 69-72.) 
In constructing the marina, the components were to be 
assembled on the shore and then floated out into the bay where 
they were connected and then stabilized with the anchoring 
system. (R. 000660, pp. 66-67, R. 000662, p. 135.) 
Of the total general contract amount, approximately 90% was 
for materials to be shipped to the construction site and 10% 
was for the actual labor in assembling the parts and placing 
them in the Bay. (Trial Exhibit D-40, pp. 2-3; see Addendum 5.) 
The general contract between FLP and Marinas Internationale 
required FLP to pay $188,979.50 as a deposit upon execution of 
the contract, $1,700,850.50 as materials were delivered to the 
job site, $174,555.00 as labor was performed in constructing 
the marina, and $19,410.00 upon final completion. (Exhibit 
D-40, pp. 2-3; see Addendum 5.) According to the general 
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contract, the marina was to be completed no later than June 12, 
1985. (R. 000608; see Addendum 2.) 
On March 1, 1985, Marinas Internationale entered into a 
subcontract with Ronald K. Neilson, an individual from the 
State of Utah. Mr. Nielson did business as Marina Mechanics 
Enterprises, a sole proprietorship. Under this subcontract 
Mr. Neilson, Marina Mechanics, was to perform certain services 
relative to the construction of the marijia. (R. 000608,629; 
see Addenda 1 and 2.) 
The contract between Marinas Internationale and Marina 
Mechanics, entitled "Installation Contract" (Trial Exhibit P-3, 
copy attached hereto as Addendum 6), required Marinas 
Internationale to pay Marina Mechanics $]L50,696 for the instal-
lation of the dock, based on a price of $1.75 per square foot 
for 86,112 square feet of dock. The Installation Contract 
further required Marina Mechanics' work -j:o be completed by May 
31, 1985, incorporated by reference the provisions of the 
contract between FLP and Marinas Internationale, and required 
Marina Mechanics to be bound by those provisions. (R. 000608-
609; see Addenda 2, 6.) The Installation Contract also 
contained the following provision: "Nothing in this article 
shall create any obligation on the part of the owner to pay or 
to see the payment of any sums to any subcontractor." (Trial 
Exhibit P-3, p. 3; see Addendum 6.) 
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On March 28, 1985, a change order to the Installation 
Contract between Marinas Internationale and Marina Mechanics 
was issued requiring Marina Mechanics to fabricate and provide 
certain anchor blocks on the marina at an additional cost to 
Marinas Internationale of $41,211. (R. 000609; see Addendum 2.) 
On May 11, 1985, Marina Mechanics began to perform as 
subcontractor on the marina construction project in assembling 
and constructing the floating dock system. (R. 000609; see 
Addendum 2.) 
While performing the subcontract work, Marina Mechanics 
submitted various pay requests to Marinas Internationale (Trial 
Exhibits P-12, 16, 20, 21, 24 and 25, collectively attached 
hereto as Addendum 7). These documents indicate Marina 
Mechanics was claiming that the original contract amount, 
between Marina Mechanics and Marinas Internationale, had 
escalated from $150,696 to $672,701.59. There was never any 
written acknowledgement or agreement from Marinas 
Internationale respecting these additions to the contract. (R. 
000659, pp. 17-18.) 
During this same time frame Marina Mechanics ordered steel 
from Astro Steel to be used in the roofing structure of the 
marina. Astro Steel then ordered the steel from B & C Steel 
Company from Nebraska and had several loads shipped to the 
construction site. (R. 000659, p. 139). 
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Beginning with the original down payment in December, 1984, 
and continuing through February, March, April, May and up to 
June 10, 1985, FLP paid a total of $2,109/168.50 to Marinas 
Internationale for materials and labor involved in the construc-
tion of the marina. (R. 000609; see Addendum 2.) When FLP 
made the last payment on its contract with Marinas 
Internationale, on June 10, 1985, Marina^ Internationale had 
informed FLP that all material had been delivered to the 
construction site and threatened to stop the job if final 
payment was not made. (R. 000662, pp. 133-136.) Additionally, 
at that time, FLP was concerned about getting the marina 
completed and opened for the 1985 summer season. (R. 000662, 
pp. 134-136.) 
Marinas Internationale made its requests tor payment to FLP 
by phone, mail, and sometimes telecopied messages wherein it 
was indicated materials had been shipped to the site and 
payment was required. (R. 000662, pp. 1^1-134.) 
Although Marinas Internationale had not paid Marina 
Mechanics all it had requested during April and May of 1985, 
Ronald Neilson was not overly concerned because he had dealt 
with Marinas Internationale on other projects and it had always 
been prompt with payment. (R. 000660, p. 74.) 
One June 12, 1985, Ronald K. Neilson submitted Request for 
Payment No. 5 (Trial Exhibit P-24; see A4dendum 7) which 
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indicated Marinas Internationale owed Marina Mechanics 
$103,332.13. (R. 000660, p. 84.) 
On June 13, 1985, Marinas Internationale, the general 
contractor, filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code. FLP had no prior knowledge or warning 
of this action. (R. 000609.) 
On June 14 or 15, 1985, after being advised that Marinas 
Internationale had filed its bankruptcy petition, Ronald K. 
Neilson prepared Request for Payment No. 6 (Trial Exhibit P-25; 
see Addendum 7), back-dated it to June 12, 1985, and increased 
the amount due, from the $103,332.13 he had requested in 
Request for Payment No. 5 a few days earlier, to $249,994.57. 
(R. 000660, p. 86.) 
Soon thereafter, Marina Mechanics refused to perform any 
further work on the marina unless measures were taken to insure 
payment. Therefore, on June 21, 1985, Rex Maughn, the president 
of FLP, visited the project and paid Marina Mechanics $20,000 
to meet its payroll for the coming week. Also, Mr. Maughn told 
Ronald K. Neilson that an agreement to keep Marina Mechanics 
working on the project would be made through his people at 
Callville Bay. (R. 000661, pp. 12,15-16 and R. 000609-610; see 
Addendum 2.) 
On July 4, 1985, the accommodation agreement between FLP 
and Marina Mechanics, as discussed by Mr. Maughn and 
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Mr. Neilson, was memorialized when Ronald K. Neilson submitted 
a weekly estimated cost for labor and equipment to complete 
Callville Bay Marina to representatives of FLP. Richard Ham 
signed that estimate for Callville Bay Resorts on behalf of 
FLP. (Trial Exhibit P-32, attached hereto as Addendum 8.) 
From July 4, 1985, until August 26, 1985, Marina Mechanics 
operated pursuant to this accommodation whereby Marina 
Mechanics was paid by joint check, payable to Marina Mechanics 
and Marinas Internationale, based upon time and material 
invoices submitted. (R. 000609-610; see Addendum 2 and 
R. 000661, pp. 209-210.) Marina Mechanics was paid in full for 
the invoices submitted. (R. 000631; see Addendum 1.) 
When Astro Steel learned of Marinas Internationale's 
bankruptcy, it held up the last shipment I of steel which was 
enroute to the construction site from B S C Steel Company in 
Nebraska. (R. 000662, p. 33.) 
From June 21, 1985 to the date of thd storm FLP paid a 
total of $52,132.70 in joint checks to Marinas Internationale/ 
Marina Mechanics. (R. 000610; see Addendum 2.) 
On July 9, 1985, another storm arose in the Callville Bay 
area of Lake Mead damaging the marina, wt^ ich was still under 
construction. (R. 000610; see Addendum 2.) 
Soon after the storm of July 9, 1985, Ronald K. Neilson and 
representatives of FLP met and discussed storm damage repair 
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work. Present at this meeting, according to Ronald K. Neilson, 
were Richard Ham and Larry Rehan, employees of FLP, and William 
Graham, an employee of Marinas Internationale. Mr. Nielson 
testified that Richard Ham promised him that FLP would pay 
Marina Mechanics for the amounts Marinas Internationale owed 
Marina Mechanics as of the time Marinas Internationale filed 
its bankruptcy petition. (R. 000661, pp. 53-54.) This 
testimony was directly refuted by the testimony of Mr. Graham. 
(R. 000659, p. 104.) 
Nearly all of the work performed by Marina Mechanics from 
July 9, 1985, the date of the storm, until August 26, 1985 was 
storm damage repair. (R. 000661, pp. 59, 71.) 
On August 26, 1985, Neilson was ordered to cease performing 
construction work in Nevada by the State Industrial Insurance 
System of Nevada for nonpayment of insurance premiums that had 
accrued in April, May and June of 1985; FLP had directly paid 
the insurance premiums for July and August pursuant to the 
accommodation between FLP and Marina Mechanics. (R. 000610; 
see Addendum 2, R. 000661, pp. 210-211.) 
After Marina Mechanics was ousted from the construction 
project by the State of Nevada, the remaining marina construc-
tion and storm damage repair work was performed by FLP using 
its own work forces. (R. 000610; see Addendum 2.) In order to 
complete the marina, FLP had to pay B & C Steel Company $36,000 
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for the final shipment of roofing steel, which had been held 
by Astro Steel, and then pay Jessop Brothers Construction 
$70,000 to install the roof. (R. 000662, pp. 138-139.) FLP 
ultimately paid more than $2,267,301.00 for the complete 
marina, exclusive of amounts it paid Marina Mechanics for the 
storm damage repair performed from July 9 to August 26, 1985. 
(R. 000611; see Addendum 2, R. 000662, pp. 138-139.) 
Even though Ron Neilson claims he had an agreement from 
FLP, in July of 1985, to pay Marina Mechanics the $249,994.57 
Marinas Internationale allegedly owed it when Marinas 
Internationale filed its bankruptcy petition, he was still 
billing Marinas Internationale for the $249,994.57 in August 
and September of 1985. (R. 000649, pp. 6, 9.) In August of 
1985, a meeting was held at Callville Bay where Astro Steel 
claims Richard Ham promised that FLP would pay Astro Steel fo 
the amounts it was still owed by Marina Mechanics/Marina 
Internationale. (R. 000659, pp. 154-155.) As noted infra, 
this testimony was found by the trial court to be incredible. 
On October 26, 1985, the Department of the Interior gave 
approval to open approximately one-half d>f the boat slips at 
the Callville Bay Marina. On January 6, 1986, the Department 
of the Interior acknowledged completion and gave its approval 
to open the completed marina. (R. 000610; see Addendum 2.) 
Due to the late completion date, FLP suffered significant 
-13-
economic losses in the form of lost profits from slip rentals 
and other sources. (R. 000611; see Addendum 2.) 
Factual Statements in Appellants' Briefs Not Supported by the 
Record. 
Both the brief of Marina Mechanics, and the brief of Astro 
Steel, contain factual assertions which are not supported by 
the record. 
Brief of Marina Mechanics 
Marina Mechanics asserts that the Installation Contract 
between Marinas Internationale and Marina Mechanics required 
Marinas Internationale to pay Marina Mechanics $150,696 for the 
installation of the dock and $304,900 to install the roof on 
the marina. (Brief of Marina Mechanics, 1f (c), p. 2.) 
Although the installation contract between Marinas 
Internationale and Marina Mechanics required Marinas 
Internationale to pay Marina Mechanics $150,696 for installa-
tion of the dock, Ron Neilson admitted on cross-examination 
that Marina Mechanics had no written contract, agreement or 
acknowledgment from Marinas Internationale acknowledging any 
further amount due and owing to him other than the $150,696 
plus the $41,211 change order. (R. 000659, pp. 17-18.) 
Marina Mechanics asserts that beginning in December of 1984 
and continuing through February, March, April, May and to 
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June 10, 1985, FLP paid a total of $1,109,168.50 to Marinas 
Internationale for materials "they thought" had been delivered 
to the site and for labor involved in th^ construction of the 
project. (Brief of Marina Mechanics, 1f ^ e), p. 3.) Marina 
Mechanics cites Amended Finding of Fact, 1f 12 as support of 
this assertion. Amended Finding of Fact 1f 12 states that FLP 
had paid a total of $1,109,168.50 to Marinas Internationale by 
June 10, 1985, the date Marinas Internationale filed its 
bankruptcy petition, for materials and labor involved in the 
construction of the marina. (R. 000609; see Addendum 2.) The 
words "they thought" appear to be added to imply FLP was 
mistaken that nearly all materials had been delivered to the 
site and most of the labor had been performed. Ronald K. 
Neilson testified, on direct examination, that when Marinas 
Internationale filed its bankruptcy petition, all of the 
material had arrived for construction of the project with the 
exception of one load of steel roofing material. (R. 000660, 
p. 78.) Also, on cross-examination Mr. Neilson testified that 
as of the time Marinas Internationale filed its bankruptcy 
petition, 71% of the labor had been performed on the marina 
construction. (R. 000661, pp. 207-208.) 
Marina Mechanics asserts that the contract between FLP and 
Marinas Internationale and the Installatipn Contract between 
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Marina Mechanics and FLP contemplated third-party benefi-
ciaries. (Brief of Marina Mechanics, 1f (m), p. 4.) Marina 
Mechanics cites Amended Finding of Fact, 1f 8, to support his 
assertion. There is no such finding in the Amended Findings of 
Fact, 1f 8. (R. 000608; see Addendum 2.) In fact, the 
Installation Contract was between Marinas Internationale and 
Marina Mechanics; FLP was not a party to that agreement. 
(Amended Finding of Fact, 1f 8, R. 000608). 
Marina Mechanics asserts that the contract between FLP and 
Marinas Internationale required FLP to meet a certain payment 
schedule and to see that subcontractors were adequately 
compensated (Brief of Marina Mechanics, p. 9), or that under 
the terms of the contract, FLP had an obligation to monitor the 
payments and the delivery of the materials to the site. (Brief 
of Marina Mechanics, p. 20.) There is no such duty or obliga-
tion set forth in the general contract. As noted above, the 
general contract sets forth a payment schedule which merely 
indicates that $188,979.50 was due as an initial deposit, the 
balance of the contract was due as materials were delivered to 
the construction site and as labor was completed and $19,410 
was due upon final completion. Furthermore, paragraph 19.1 of 
that contract specifically states that Marinas Internationale 
was required to pay for all labor, materials, equipment, tools, 
construction, equipment and machinery, water, heat, utilities, 
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transportation and other facilities and Services necessary for 
the proper execution and completion of tl>e work. (See 
Addendum 5.) 
Marina Mechanics argues that when Marinas Internationale 
filed its bankruptcy petition on June 13, 1985, FLP had already 
breached the written agreement, (Brief of Marina Mechanics, 
p. 9.) and that FLP's payments to Marinas Internationale were 
"improper and in violation of the terms of the contractual 
agreement." (Brief of Marina Mechanics, p. 13). There is no 
evidence to support this position nor were there any findings 
of fact or conclusions of law on that point. 
Marina Mechanics asserts that on June 10, 1985, when FLP 
made the final payment on its contract with Marinas 
Internationale the work was only 30 to 40% complete. (Brief of 
Marina Mechanics, p. 13.) This is incorrect. Approximately 
90% of the general contract amount was fqr materials to be 
delivered and 10% was for labor. As noted, Ronald K. Neilson 
admitted that at the time FLP made the last payment to Marinas 
Internationale, nearly all of the materials had been delivered 
to the site and approximately 70% of the labor had been 
performed. In other words, only 3% of the total contract 
remained to be completed. 
Marina Mechanics asserts that on June 21, 1985 when the 
accommodation was reached between Marina Mechanics and FLP, the 
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accommodation included an oral agreement by FLP to pay for the 
debt owed by Marinas Internationale to Marina Mechanics. 
(Brief of Marina Mechanics, p. 15). This, also, is incorrect. 
Ronald K. Neilson testified that the alleged oral promise or 
agreement by FLP to pay Marina Mechanics for the unpaid debt 
owed by Marinas Internationale took place sometime after the 
storm of July 9, 1985. (R. 000661, pp. 53-54.) No one has 
ever contended that FLP promised, on June 21, 1985, to pay 
Marina Mechanics for the amounts Marinas Internationale owed 
Marina Mechanics. 
Marina Mechanics asserts that both experts who testified at 
trial agreed that FLP's payments to MI prior to the completion 
of the work were not proper. (Brief of Marina Mechanics, 
p. 27.) That is not correct. Joseph R. Brandise, the expert 
called by FLP, when asked about the propriety of an owner 
paying out a full contract price to a general contractor prior 
to the completion of the contract, stated, "[tlhat's the 
owner's discretion. He can do anything he wants to do. It's 
his money." (R. 000661, p. 116.) 
Marina Mechanics asserts that, at the conclusion of the 
testimony presented, the court refused to allow further 
testimony regarding issues of damages and ruled that the 
recovery under negligence for economic loss was not 
appropriate. (Brief of Marina Mechanics, p. 27.) While it is 
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true the court ruled that under Nevada law recovery is not 
allowed on a negligence theory for economic loss, (R. 000631), 
the court never precluded appellants from adducing evidence 
except on matters not pleaded. And, the court did not hear and 
rule upon FLP's Rule 41(b) Motion to Dismiss until after Marina 
Mechanics and Astro Steel had rested. 
Brief of Astro Steel 
Astro Steel asserts that the contract between FLP and 
Marinas Internationale and the contract between FLP and Marina 
Mechanics both contemplate third-party beneficiaries. (Brief 
of Astro Steel, p. 3.) Astro Steel cites the Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to support this assertion. 
There is no finding of fact or conclusion of law which 
indicates a contract between FLP and Marina Mechanics 
contemplated third-party beneficiaries. 
Astro Steel asserts that FLP paid th^ full contract amount 
to Marinas Internationale when the contract was only 30% 
completed. (Brief of Astro Steel, p. 7.) While it was later 
determined that at the time Marinas Internationale filed for 
bankruptcy, approximately 30% of the labor for constructing the 
marina had been completed, the labor portion of the general 
contract was only 10% of the total contract price. Addition-
ally, as previously noted at that time it was being represented 
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to FLP that 70% of the labor for construction had been 
completed and all materials had been delivered to the site. 
Astro Steel, like Marina Mechanics, argues that the trial 
court did not allow Astro Steel to "present further evidence of 
the negligent payment issue." (Brief of Astro Steel, p. 8.) 
The Rule 41(b) motion was not heard and ruled upon until after 
Astro Steel had rested. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does Nevada law allow recovery of purely economic 
damages on a negligence theory? 
2. Was the trial court correct in dismissing appellants', 
Marina Mechanics' and Astro Steel's, claims involving alleged 
oral promises or agreements because the evidence was too vague 
and indefinite to support a finding of an oral contract between 
the parties? 
3. Was the trial court correct in ruling that even if any 
oral promises or agreements were made by FLP, recovery on those 
promises or agreements was barred by the applicable statute of 
frauds (§ 111.220 Nev. Rev. Stat. (1986)) as promises to answer 
for the debt of another? 
4. Was the trial court correct in ruling that because 
Marina Mechanics' rights and obligations relative to FLP and 
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the marina construction were covered by express, written agree-
ments, and because the record contained insufficient evidence 
for the court to determine the damages attributable to a claim 
for unjust enrichment, Marina Mechanics was precluded from 
recovery on an unjust enrichment theory? 
5. Was the trial court correct in ruling that because FLP 
paid a substantial sum for completion of its marina it was not 
unjustly enriched by either Marina Mechanics or Astro Steel? 
6. Was the trial court correct in dismissing Marina 
Mechanics' and Astro Steel's claims as third-party benefi-
ciaries because Marina Mechanics, by contract, and both Marina 
Mechanics and Astro Steel, by law, assumed the rights and 
obligations of Marinas Internationale and, therefore, became 
subject to all defenses, damages and offsets available to FLP, 
which precluded any recovery? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 111.220 (1986): 
Agreements not in writing: When voic^ L 
In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void, unless such agreement, or some note or memo-
randum thereof expressing the consideration, be in 
writing, and subscribed by the party charged therewith: 
1. Every agreement that, by the terms, is 
not to be performed within 1 ye4r from the making 
thereof. 
2. Every special promise to answer for the 
debt, default or miscarriage of another. 
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3. Every promise or undertaking made upon 
consideration of marriage, except mutual promises 
to marry. (1861, p. 11; CL 1873, § 289; GS 1885, 
§ 2630; CL 1900, § 2700; RL 1912, § 1075; CL 1929, 
§ 1553.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel have not challenged 
any of the trial court's findings of fact, this Court must 
review the conclusions of law and, if correct, affirm the 
judgment in favor of FLP and against Marina Mechanics and Astro 
Steel. 
The trial court was correct in ruling in favor of FLP on 
the negligence claims because Nevada law, which applies to this 
case, states that purely economic losses are not recoverable on 
negligence claims, such as those in this case. Marina 
Mechanics and Astro Steel urge this court to apply law from 
other jurisdictions when Nevada law is unequivocable on this 
point. 
Marina Mechanics' and Astro Steel's claims involving oral 
promises or agreements were properly dismissed because the 
evidence was too vague and indefinite to support a finding of 
an oral contract between the parties. The evidence on this 
point revealed that when the promise was allegedly made to 
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Ronald K. Neilson, Willxcmi uLdndiu, an uiuui.d;sfc?u LuiLu party, who 
was identified by Ronald Neilson as being present when the 
promise was made, testified he never heard any such promise. 
And, the trial court found the testimony of Milton S. Taylor, 
president of Astro Steel, incredible regarding the promise he 
allegedly heard, because he changed his story. Additionally, 
the trial court ruled that even if any si^ ch promises were made, 
recovery upon them was barred by the applicable statute of 
frauds as being promises to answer for the debt of another. 
The judgment in favor of FLP on the unjust enrichment 
claims was correct because FLP paid more than it originally 
agreed to under its contract with Marinas Internationale and, 
therefore, its enrichment was not "unjust." FLP paid more than 
$2,267,000 for the marina when it was supposed to pay no more 
than $2,185,500. Under Nevada law, when an owner pays substan-
tially all of the amount due on a prime contract to the general 
contractor, a subcontractor may not recover as against the 
owner on an unjust enrichment claim. Furthermore, Marina 
Mechanics' rights and obligations relative to the marina 
construction were governed by an express, written agreement 
which precludes recovery in quasi-contract. 
The judgment in favor of FLP on the tpird-party beneficiary 
claims was correct because FLP fully performed its obligations 
under its contract with Marinas Internationale, through which 
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Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel make their claim; therefore, 
there is nothing left for FLP to be compelled to do. Also, 
Marinas Internationale breached its contract with FLP which 
releases FLP from any obligation for further performance. And, 
by claiming the third party beneficiary status through the 
Marinas Internationale/FLP general contract Marina Mechanics 
and Astro Steel become subject to all defenses, damages and 
offsets available to FLP and are thereby precluded from 
recovery. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"To mount a successful attack on the trial court's findings 
of fact, appellants must marshal all the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the court 
below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings." 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1985); see also, 
General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Co., P.2d , 
84 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 38 (Utah 1988). Conclusions of law are 
accorded no particular deference, but are reviewed for 
correctness. Id. 
As noted previously, the district court entered two sets of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case. The 
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first related to defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal 
and the second pursuant to the court's ruling at the conclusion 
of the case. 
Astro Steel does not take issue with any of the findings of 
fact entered by the court because in its statement of facts it 
cites the court's Amended Findings of Fact as setting forth the 
"pertinent facts relative to this appeal." (Brief of Astro 
Steel, p. 2.) There are no specific challenges made by Marina 
Mechanics to any of the findings of fact entered by the court. 
However, in its list of issues presented, Marina Mechanics 
makes the following assertion: "[hjowever, the record substan-
tiates that there is more than sufficient evidence to support 
said claim (unjust enrichment) and the court erred in its 
judgment on this issue." (Brief of Marina Mechanics, 1f (a), p. 
5.) 
This appears to be a challenge to thd findings of fact 
relative to the unjust enrichment claim. However, in its 
argument on that point Marina Mechanics makes the following 
statement, "[i]n this case, the appellant does not challenge 
the trial court's findings of fact as to the claim itself 
because plaintiff asserts that the trial (court's findings 
establish a claim for unjust enrichment." (Brief of Marina 
Mechanics, p. 11.) Therefore, there are no challenges to any 
of the trial court's findings of fact and this Court must 
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review the trial court's conclusions of law and, if they are 
correct, affirm the judgment in favor of FLP. 
A comparison of Marina Mechanics' and Astro Steel's 
statement of issues presented and the trial court's conclusions 
of law indicates the following conclusions of law are being 
challenged: 
1. The economic losses suffered by Neilson and/or Astro 
are not recoverable and do not support a claim of negligence. 
(Conclusion of Law No. 3, R. 000631; see Addendum 1.) 
2. Any oral promises made by FLP to Neilson are barred 
pursuant to the applicable statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 111.220 (1986), as promises to answer for the debt of 
another. (Conclusion of Law No. 4, R. 000631; see Addendum 1.) 
3. The evidence adduced is too vague and indefinite to 
support the finding of an oral contract between the parties to 
this action. (Conclusion of Law No. 5, R. 000631; see 
Addendum 1.) 
4. Any rights and/or obligations which existed between 
FLP and Neilson were covered by express, written agreements 
which preclude any recovery by Neilson based upon a theory of 
unjust enrichment. (Conclusion of Law No. 4, R. 000612; see 
Addendum 2.) 
5. The record contains insufficient evidence for the 
court to determine damages attributable to a claim of unjust 
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enrichment by Neilson. (Conclusion of Law No. 5, R. 000612; 
see Addendum 2.) 
6. FLP paid a substantial sum for completion of the 
Callville Bay Marina and therefore has not been unjustly 
enriched by either Neilson or Astro. (Conclusion of Law No. 6, 
R. 000612; see Addendum 2.) 
7. Under the terms of the Installation Contract, Neilson 
agreed to assume all the obligations that Marinas Internationale 
had to FLP. The defenses and liquidated damages available to 
FLP under the General Contract excuse FLP from any performance 
or obligation to Neilson as a third-party beneficiary and 
preclude any recovery by Neilson. (Conclusion of Law No. 7, R. 
000612; see Addendum 2.) 
8. Both Neilson and Astro, by claiming third-party 
beneficiary status, assume the rights and obligations of 
Marinas Internationale and subject themselves to all defenses 
available to FLP under the terms of the General Contract. 
Marinas Internationale is in material breach of the General 
Contract entered into with FLP. FLP is thereby excused from 
any further performance. Therefore, neither Neilson nor Astro 
may recover as third party beneficiaries to the general 
contract. (Conclusion of Law No. 8, R. 000612; see Addendum 2.) 
9. The liquidated and other damaged available to FLP 
under the general contract offset any third-party benefits 
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claimed by Astro. (Conclusion of Law No. 9, R. 000612; see 
Addendum 2.) 
Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel do not challenge the 
dismissal of their claims for tortious interference with 
contractual relations. 
Additionally, the trial court ruled that this case is 
governed by Nevada law (R. 000647, pp. 4-5; see Addendum 3.) 
Neither Marina Mechanics nor Astro Steel challenged the Court's 
ruling on that point at trial, nor do they here. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT 
NEVADA LAW DOES NOT ALLOW A CLAIM BASED UPON 
A NEGLIGENCE THEORY WHERE ONLY ECONOMIC 
DAMAGES ARE ALLEGED. 
The only damages alleged by Marina Mechanics and Astro 
Steel were for economic losses. There were no allegations of 
personal injury or property damage of any kind. The Supreme 
Court of Nevada has made it clear that, " . . . absent privity 
of contract, or an injury to a person or property, a plaintiff 
may not recover in negligence for economic loss." Local Joint 
Exec. Board of Las Vegas v. Stern, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (Nev. 
1982), and cases cited therein. In explaining this rule the 
Supreme Court of Nevada stated: 
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Id, 
The primary purpose of the rule is to shield a 
defendant from unlimited liability for all of the 
economic consequences of a negligent act, particularly 
in a commercial or professional setting, and thus to 
keep the risk of liability reasonably calculable. 
A small minority of jurisdiction^ do permit 
recovery for a negligent interference with economic 
expectancies under certain limited circumstances. 
However, we believe the tests that have been developed 
to determine who should recover for negligent interfer-
ence with contract or prospective economic advantage 
are presently inadequate to guide trial courts to 
consistent, predictable, and fair results. The 
foreseeability of economic loss, even when modified by 
other factors, is a standard that sweeps too broadly 
in a professional or commercial context, portending 
liability that is socially harmful in its potential 
scope and uncertainty. We therefore decline to adopt 
the minority view allowing such recovery. 
this Court to, in Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel urge 
I 
effect, overrule the Nevada Supreme Court} and apply a rule of 
law which was specifically rejected by that court. The only 
case from Nevada cited by Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel in 
support of their position is Williams v. City of North Las 
Vegas, 541 P.2d 652 (Nev. 1975). That case was a wrongful 
death action where the court held, ". . .an individual, 
although unnamed in a contract or a stranger to both parties 
thereto, may bring suit where a breach off the contract has 
caused him injury." Id. at 655. (Emphasis added). FLP does 
not disagree with that proposition, but there is no injury to 
person or property alleged here. Marina Mechanics and Astro 
-29-
Steel have submitted no authority, from Nevada, for the 
position they are taking. 
Astro Steel claims that it incurred damages which are not 
purely economic, i.e., lost bonding capacity. No matter what 
they choose to call it, Astro Steel's claim is for economic 
damages. Lost bonding capacity is not an injury to a person or 
physical property damage. 
Additionally, even after Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel 
presented all of their evidence on their negligence claims, the 
trial court was not convinced, one way or the other, that a 
breach of any duty had been shown. (R. 000647, pp. 4-5; see 
Addendum 3.) Therefore, appellants did not meet their burden 
of proof on a negligence claim, even if Nevada law recognized a 
negligence claim for purely economic loss. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF ALL CLAIMS 
INVOLVING ALLEGED ORAL PROMISES OR 
AGREEMENTS WAS CORRECT. 
Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel allege that Richard Ham, a 
representative of FLP, promised Ron Neilson that Marina 
Mechanics would be compensated for amounts which were owed it 
by Marinas Internationale when Marinas Internationale filed its 
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bankruptcy petition. Speciricany, Kon wenson testiried 
Richard Ham told him that "out of the insurance proceeds that 
were - would be collected, I would recover the loss - my short-
fall on that project or my losses sustained on the project." 
(R. 000661, p. 51.) He also testified, on cross-examination 
that, "[w]hat I was promised was that I ^ ould have my losses 
recouped and made whole again. I don't know the exact words 
that were used and whether there was an exact figure put on 
that or not, I don't recall." (R. 000659, p. 16.) This 
conversation allegedly took place immediately following the 
storm of July 9, 1985. Others present, as identified by Ronald 
K. Neilson, were Richard Ham, Larry Rehan and William Graham. 
(R. 000661, pp. 53-54.) Mr. Graham, who was an employee of 
Marinas Internationale and, therefore, a disinterested by-
stander, at least as to the outcome of this lawsuit, testified 
that he never heard Mr. Ham make any such promises. (R. 00659, 
p. 104.) 
At trial, Milton Taylor, president of Astro Steel, 
testified that Richard Ham made a similar promise to him on 
August 8, 1985, at Callville Bay. Specifically, he testified: 
At first he (Richard Ham) said that they (FLP) 
weren't responsible for the payment of that bill; that 
it was Marinas Internationale and Marinas 
Internationale having filed a bankruptcy, he didn't 
know what was going to happen on that money. After a 
little bit of discussion there was something brought 
up about a licorice factory or something that Marinas 
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Internationale was trying to sell and they were 
holding up any payment contemplating getting some 
money back from Marinas Internationale on that 
licorice factory. And they said that we would be 
getting our money when they got — they wanted to see 
how much they could get back out of Marinas 
Internationale first and then they would, you know, 
use that money to pay us and make up whatever balance 
we needed to get. 
(R. 000659, pp. 154-155). 
At his deposition Mr. Taylor testified that he never heard 
Richard Ham make any such promises to anyone. (Transcript of 
Deposition of Milton S. Taylor, pp. 21-22, 37-40.) The trial 
court indicated it found Mr. Taylor's testimony incredible 
because he changed his story. (R. 000647, pp. 8-9; see 
Addendum 3.) The court dismissed the claims regarding the 
alleged oral promises or agreements on two separate grounds. 
First, the court found that the oral promises allegedly made by 
FLP to Marina Mechanics were barred pursuant to the Nevada 
statute of frauds (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 111-220 (1986)) as 
promises to answer for the debt of another. (R. 000631; see 
Addendum 1.) Second, the court found the evidence adduced was 
too vague and indefinite to support the finding of an oral 
contract between the parties to the action. The trial court's 
ruling on this issue is instructive: 
. . . the Supreme Court of various states, including 
Utah, has said that you can't enforce an oral contract 
unless it's definite enough so that you'll know that 
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the terms of it are. In other words, a vague agree-
ment that is so unspecific so as to be unenforceable 
cannot be enforced in an oral agreement. And this 
just gets back to the— it's just good business sense 
to have writings, and people don't find themselves in 
these positions. 
But I can't enforce that contract. I don't know 
what recoop his losses means, even if it occured. And 
at this stage of the proceedings, that's all the 
evidence there is. And I don't have to decide whether 
it was really said or it wasn't said. But taking the 
evidence the way it was, Mr. Neilsen, the only thing 
he's been able to say, and I appreciate the parties' 
candor in this case, but, is that Forever Living 
Products quote, "promised to recoop his losses." 
Promised to allow him to recoop his losses. And I 
don't have — I couldn't enforce that, not in good 
conscience, because I wouldn't know what number to put 
on it. I 
And if I put the $240,000 figure on it that 
Marinas Internationale was supposed to pay, then it's 
answering for the debt of another, clearly. So I 
can't enforce an oral contract that one in particular, 
that is so vague and so indefinite that I don't know 
it's terms, because I wouldn't know what to tell the 
defendant to pay. It would just be sheer speculation. 
And the same is true with the agreement in August. 
I have trouble with Mr. Taylor's testimony, 
because he did testify, at least in my judgment, in 
different ways on different occasions. And perhaps 
the reason he suggested, that he was tired, and it was 
a long day is the reason for that. But that doesn't 
explain, unfortunately, why that was not added to, or 
why that clarity was not made when the deposition was 
read. 
But even if I take what was said on the witness 
stand today, the same problem exists with regard to 
the August meeting. It's so indefinite, and so vague 
that I can't hold the defendant on an oral contract 
for that claim that we're going to pay the balance due 
after Marinas Internationale is now in bankruptcy and 
sells some licorice factory. There is just nothing 
there — nothing that rises to the level of what the 
law is going to impose an obligation on a party who 
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does not agree that there was an oral contract. And I 
think the law is pretty clear on that. 
(R. 000647, pp. 7-9; see Addendum 3.) 
Marina Mechanics argues that the statute of frauds does not 
apply if there is part performance of the alleged oral agree-
ment or detrimental reliance pursuant to the alleged oral 
agreement. Marina Mechanics states that representations by FLP 
regarding the repayment or recouping of losses from MI induced 
Neilson to remain upon a job to his detriment. (Brief of 
Marina Mechanics, p. 18). There is no evidence to support this 
position. The alleged representation took place on July 9, or 
10th, 1985. (R. 000659, pp. 5-6.) This was after the accommo-
dation agreement (Trial Exhibit P-32; see Addendum 7) had 
already been executed by Ron Neilson and FLP indicating Marina 
Mechanics would be paid on a time and materials basis as 
invoices were submitted. Ron Neilson testified, and the trial 
court found, that Marina Mechanics was paid in full by FLP for 
all amounts invoiced, pursuant to the accommodation agreement. 
(R. 000661, p. 209; R. 000631; see Addendum 1.) Marina 
Mechanics operated pursuant to that accommodation agreement 
until August 26, 1985 when it was ousted from the project by 
the State Industrial Insurance Fund of Nevada. It is clear 
that, even if Rich Ham promised Ron Neilson something, there 
was no reliance upon or performance pursuant to such a 
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promise. Specifically, the trial court found, "[i]'m also 
satisfied that to the extent a contract was created by the 
estimate that was signed by I believe it was Mr. Ham on behalf 
of Forever Living Products for the work that went on after 
July, that Mr. Neilsen has received everything that he is 
entitled to." (R. 000647, p. 10; see Addendum 3.) 
The part performance exception to the statute of frauds is 
available only when an equitable remedy is sought. See, Baugh 
v. Parley, 184 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1947). As was stated in 
William Henry Brophy College v. Tovar, 619 P.2d 19 (Ariz. App. 
1980), "[w]e believe the correct rule . . . to be that where a 
party attempting to enforce an oral agreement seeks an 
equitable remedy, such as specific performance, the equitable 
doctrine of estoppel and part performance are available to 
him. Where he seeks only a legal remedy, such as money damages 
for breach, they are not." Ld. at 23 (citations omitted). 
Because Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel seek damages, not 
equitable relief, the partial performance exception does not 
apply to this case. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT 
FLP WAS NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY MARINA 
MECHANICS AND ASTRO STEEL BECAUSE FLP PAID 
FULL VALUE FOR EVERYTHING IT RECEIVED. 
It is well established that a subcontractor is precluded 
from recovering against a property owner in quasi-contract 
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where the owner has already paid its general contractor all, or 
a substantial part of, the amount due under the terms of the 
general contract. To allow the subcontractor to recover from 
the landowner under such circumstances requires the owner to 
pay twice. See, 62 ALR 3d 288 (1975), and authorities cited 
therein. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada has unequivocally adopted this 
position. In Zalk-Joseph's Co. v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 366 P.2d 
339 (Nev. 1961), the court considered a materialman's claim 
against a general contractor based on unjust enrichment. The 
court summarily rejected it, finding that the defendant had no 
dealings with the plaintiff and had not in any way been 
unjustly enriched by plaintiff's labor and services. The 
defendant, the court noted, had paid its subcontractor the 
precise amount paid by the owner for the materials provided by 
plaintiff to the subcontractor. _Id. at 342. 
In Bowyer v. Davidson, 584 P.2d 686 (Nev. 1978), the court 
considered a subcontractor's unjust enrichment claim against an 
owner. In that case the owner had paid the general contractor 
all but 2% of the contract price. The court held that under 
such circumstances recovery based on unjust enrichment was 
unwarranted: 
[Owner] paid the [general contractor] substantially 
all of the amount due on the prime contract. 
Moreover, appellant could have protected himself by 
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the exercise of his lien rights against the property. 
N.R.S. 108.222. Under these circumstances, the 
enrichment, if any, resulting to the respondents from 
appellant's labor and materials is not unjust. 
Id. at 688, (citations omitted). 
In this case, the trial court found that FLP paid more than 
$2,267,000 for completion of the marina. The general contract 
between FLP and Marinas Internationale provides that FLP was to 
receive a complete marina for a price between $2,083,760 and 
$2,185,500 depending on the dollar amount ultimately expended 
for the marina anchoring system. Neither Marina Mechanics nor 
Astro Steel have presented any authority suggesting that an 
owner can be unjustly enriched by materials or services for 
which it has already paid. Nevada law, as expressed in the 
Zalk-Joseph's and Bowyer cases, is dispositive on this issue. 
Marina Mechanics argues that, even though FLP paid full 
price for its marina, it was unjustly enriched because its 
payments to Marinas Internationale were improper and in 
violation of the terms of the terms of the contractual 
agreement. (Brief of Marina Mechanics, p. 13). There is no 
basis in law or the facts for that proposition. As noted, 
there was no duty or obligation in the FLP/Marinas 
Internationale contract for FLP to see that monies paid to 
Marinas Internationale went to subcontractors and materialmen. 
Nor has it been established that FLP breached its agreement 
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with Marinas Internationale. Marina Mechanics has cited no 
authority for its position even if FLP, somehow, breached its 
contract with Marinas Internationale. Therefore, the 
unchallenged finding of fact that FLP paid over $2,267,000 for 
a marina which was supposed to have been constructed for 
hundred of thousands of dollars less, supports the conclusion 
of law that FLP has not been unjustly enriched by either Marina 
Mechanics or Astro Steel. 
The trial court also ruled that Marina Mechanics could not 
prevail on its unjust enrichment claim because it had an 
express agreement which delineated its rights and liabilities. 
It is well established that recovery based on unjust enrichment 
is unavailable when the services or materials for which it is 
sought are furnished pursuant to an express contract. If this 
were not the rule, written compensation agreements would be 
meaningless. O'Keeffe v. Bry, 456 F. Supp. 822, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978). 
In effect, Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel are asking this 
Court to rewrite the contracts to make FLP responsible for 
payment directly to subcontractors and material men. The 
Supreme Court of Nevada in Lipshie v. Tracy Investment Co., 566 
P.2d 819 (Nev. 1977), stated, "[t]o permit recovery by quasi-
contract where a written agreement exists would constitute a 
subversion of contractual principles." _Id. at 824. The same 
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rule applies here; to require FLP to pay more for the marina 
than it has already paid would require a reformation of the 
written contracts involved in this case. FLP submits that such 
a reformation was not pleaded and is not supported in this case 
by the facts or the law. While it is unfortunate that Marina 
Mechanics and Astro Steel may not have received full payment 
for services and/or materials provided for the marina construc-
tion, the responsibility for any such nonpayment does not rest 
with FLP. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING A 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF FLP ON THE THIRD-PARTY 
BENEFICIARY CLAIMS. 
The trial court granted judgment in IOVUL u£ FLP on the 
third-party beneficiary claims on several grounds. First, 
Marina Mechanics, in its contract with Marinas Internationale, 
agreed to assume all the obligations that Marinas Internationale 
owed to FLP; therefore, the defenses and liquidated damages 
available to FLP preclude any recovery by Neilson. Second, as 
third-party beneficiary claimants, Marina Mechanics and Astro 
Steel were subject to all defenses available to FLP under the 
terms of the general contract; third, Marinas Internationale 
was in material breach of the general contract and, therefore, 
FLP was excused from any further performance, and fourth, the 
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liquidated and other damages available to FLP under the general 
contract offset any third-party benefits claimed by Marina 
Mechanics and Astro Steel. (R. 000613; see Addendum 2.) 
The general rule is that, "[o]ne suing on a contract 
allegedly made for his benefit as a third-party beneficiary 
must accept the contract as it was made by the parties thereto; 
and he is in no better position than, and his rights are not 
greater than those of, the contracting party through whom he 
claims, ..." Stevens v. Great Southern Savings & Loan 
Ass'n., 421 S.W.2d 332, 340 (Mo. 1967). 
The Supreme Court of Nevada has, in several cases, 
expressed its agreement with this general rule. In Morelli v. 
Morelli, 720 P.2d 704 (Nev. 1986), the court, citing Britton v 
Groom, 373 P.2d 1012 (Okla. 1962), stated "[a] third-party 
beneficiary who seeks to enforce a contract does so subject to 
the defenses that would be valid as between the parties." In 
Gibbs v. Giles, 607 P.2d 118 (Nev. 1980), the court noted the 
general rule that "a third-party beneficiary takes subject to 
any defense arising from the contract that is assertible 
against the promisee, ..." .Id. at 120. Thus, Marina 
Mechanics' and Astro Steel's rights as third-party benefi-
ciaries are no greater than those of Marinas Internationale, 
the party through whom they claim the benefit. FLP fully 
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performed its obligations under the terms of the prime con-
tract; no further performance by FLP is required. Marinas 
Internationale was paid everything it was owed under the 
general contract. However, Marinas Internationale failed to 
complete the project and, therefore, breached the contract. If 
Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel elect to accept the contract 
of Marinas Internationale, they become subject to the defenses, 
damages and the penalty provision of paragraph 9 of the general 
contract requiring payment of at least $104,000 in liquidated 
damages for failure to meet the performance schedule. The 
general contract is an integrated and indivisible document. 
Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel seek to sever the contract, 
choose the parts which are beneficial to them and discard the 
rest. To assert any rights under the contract, they must 
accept the terms of the entire document. 
It is axiomatic that a material breach of contract by one 
party fully justifies a suspension of performance by the 
other. Lagrange Construction Co. v. Kent Corp., 429 P.2d 58, 
59 (Nev. 1967); Cladianos v. Friedhoff, 240 P.3d 208 (Nev. 
1952); Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 237 (1979). Even if 
there were something left for FLP to perform under its contract 
with Marinas Internationale, such performance was rendered 
unnecessary by Marinas Internationale's breach of the 
contract. As is expressed in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, § 309(2) (1979): 
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If a contract ceases to be binding in whole or in part 
because of the impracticability, public policy, 
non-occurrence of a condition, or present or 
prospective failure of performance, the right of any 
beneficiary is to that extent discharged or modified. 
(Emphasis added) 
Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel cite Morelli v. Morelli, 
supra, as support for the argument that they should obtain 
further performance from FLP even though FLP has fully 
performed its contract with Marinas Internationale and even 
though Marinas Internationale breached that contract. In that 
case a husband and wife entered into a property settlement 
agreement wherein the husband agreed to pay the cost of tuition 
for their child at the college the parties agreed was most 
appropriate. A few years after the agreement was executed, the 
wife died and appellant, the child, sued the father to force 
him to pay her college tuition. The husband contended that the 
child, as a third-party beneficiary, stepped into the shoes of 
the wife and since the wife did not agree on which school was 
most appropriate for the child, as required by the agreement, 
the child could not enforce the contract. In ruling on the 
issue, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that, although a third-
party beneficiary who seeks to enforce a contract does so 
subject to the defenses that would be valid as between the 
parties, the wife's death made compliance with that provision 
impossible and did not shift the responsibility to the child. 
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Id. at 706. Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel argue that it was 
impossible for them to perform Marinas Internationale's 
obligations under the contract, therefore they should be able 
to recover as against FLP. It is not FLP's position that the 
failure of a condition precedent absolves it of its obligations 
under the general contract. FLP's position is that it has 
already performed its obligations and is excused from any 
further performance because of Marinas Internationale's 
material breach of the contract. Additionally, the liquidated 
damages and other damages available to FLP offset any possible 
claim Marina Mechanics or Astro Steel might have. 
CONCLUSION 
Although it is unfortunate that Marina Mechanics and Astro 
Steel did not receive all they feel they were owed for labor 
and materials supplied to construct the Callville Bay Marina, 
the responsibility for this problem does not rest with FLP. 
The party which should bear the responsibility, Marinas 
Internationale, has been shielded by the United States 
Bankruptcy laws. FLP has suffered as a result of Marinas 
Internationale's actions, as well. Instead of having a com-
plete marina in June of 1985 for the cost of $2,185,000, FLP 
received a complete marina in January of 1986 at a cost of over 
$2,267,000. 
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The trial court was correct in its dismissal of and 
judgment in favor of FLP upon the claims asserted by Marina 
Mechanics and Astro Steel. The trial court's findings of fact 
are unchallenged by Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel and are 
supported by the evidence. The trial court's conclusions of 
law are correct and the judgment in favor of FLP should be 
affirmed. 
DATED t h i s ffifii day of August, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Geoi/ge A. Hunt 
Ryai\/E. Tibbitts 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Forever Living Products, Inc. 
SCMRET116 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Defendant's Motion 
for Involuntary Dismissal 
u 
GEORGE A. HUNT (A1586) 
RYAN E. TIBBITTS (A4423) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD K. NEILSON, dba MARINA 
MECHANICS ENTERPRISES, and 
ASTRO STEEL CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation (Intervenor), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS, INC., 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 
Case JNO . U85-6367 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
This matter came on regularly before the court for a non-
jury trial on June 9, 1987, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
District Judge, presiding; Edwin T. Peterson of Maddox & 
Snuffer appearing for plaintiff, Ronald K. Neilson, dba Marina 
Mechanics Enterprises, (hereinafter "Neilson"); J. Ray Barrios 
of Mueller, Barrios & Christiansen, appearing for plaintiff 
intervenor Astro Steel Corporation, (hereinafter "Astro"); and 
George A. Hunt and Ryan E. Tibbitts of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau appearing for defendant Forever Living Products, 
Inc., (hereinafter "FLP"); and the plaintiff and plaintiff 
intervenor having adduced evidence by way of testimony and 
documentary exhibits and having argued the matter to the court, 
and the court having reviewed the file, exhibits and memoranda 
submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the pre-
mises, and the defendant having moved for involuntary dismissal 
of the claims of plaintiff and intervenor pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 41(b) and the court having considered arguments of 
counsel, and good cause appearing, now, therefore, the court 
hereby makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Ronald K. Neilson is an individual residing 
in the State of Utah and doing business as Marina Mechanics, 
Enterprises, a sole proprietorship with its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff Intervenor, Astro Steel Corporation, is a 
Utah corporation in good standing with its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendant, Forever Living Products, Inc., is an 
Arizona corporation registered to do business in the State of 
Utah, and doing business in, among other locations, the State 
of Nevada. 
4. The claims of Neilson and Astro arose in the State of 
Nevada. 
5. On December 12, 1984, a General Construction Contract 
was entered between FLP and Marinas Internationale which 
created a direct economic relationship between them. 
6. None of the parties have adduced any evidence proving 
that FLP intentionally interfered with the contractual 
relations between Marinas Internationale and Neilson. 
7. All damages suffered by Neilson and Astro as shown by 
the evidence adduced in this action are purely economic in 
nature. No damage to persons or property has been proved. 
8. The only evidence adduced by plaintiff to support a 
claim for damages for breach of oral contract is that FLP 
promised to "recoup Neilson's losses." Such representations, 
if made, constitute a promise by FLP to answer for a debt of 
Marinas Internationale. | 
9. No promise was made by FLP to Astro to pay the balance 
due Astro by Marinas Internationale. I 
10. Neilson failed to pay the workman's compensation pre-
miums required by Nevada law long before Marinas Internationale 
declared bankruptcy on June 13, 1985. The failure to make 
these required payments was the sole cause of Neilson being 
forced to leave the Callville Bay Maritia construction site and 
to cease construction work in the State of Nevada. 
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11. All the work performed by Neilson after July 9, 1985, 
pursuant to the arrangement between the parties, was paid for 
in full by FLP pursuant to invoices submitted by Neilson. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court draws the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The State of Nevada is the state with the most 
significant relationship to the transactions here in question. 
Therefore, Nevada law applies. 
2. FLP had a significant financial interest and its own 
contractual relationship which justified any interference with 
the Neilson-Marinas Internationale Installation Contract. 
3. The economic losses suffered by Neilson and/or Astro 
are not recoverable and do not support a claim of negligence. 
4. Any oral promises made by FLP to Neilson are barred 
pursuant to the applicable statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 111.220 (1986), as promises to answer for the debt of another. 
5. The evidence adduced is too vague and indefinite to 
support the finding of an oral contract between the parties to 
this action. 
6. Defendant's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal should be 
granted against both plaintiff and intervener in accordance 
herewith and an appropriate Judgment of Dismissal entered. 
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DATED thi 1.-2. day of 
*imothy R. Hanson 
d i s t r i c t Court Judge 
By XJ2UW/?C\£ 
ATTEST 
«3=fc 
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ikz 
GEORGE A. HUNT (A1586) 
RYAN E. TIBBITTS (A4423) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE "OUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH I 
RONALD K. NEILSON, dba MARINA 
MECHANICS ENTERPRISES, and 
ASTRO STEEL CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation (Intervenor), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS, INC., 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. C85-6367 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
This matter came on regularly before the court for a non-
jury trial on June 9, 198r\ tne honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
Utah State District Judge, presiding; Edwin T Peterson of 
Maddox & Snuffer appearing for plaintiff, Ronald K. Neilson, 
dba Marine Mechanics Enterprises, (hereinafter Neilson"); J. 
Ray Barrios of Mueller, Barrios & Christiansen, appearing for 
plaintiff intervenor Astro Steel Corporation, (hereinafter 
"Astro"); 
Christensen & Martineau appearing for defendant Forever Living 
Products, Inc., (hereinafter "FLP"); and the parties having 
adduced evidence by way of testimony and documentary exhibits 
and having argued the matter to the court, and the court having 
reviewed the file, exhibits and memoranda submitted by the 
parties and being fully advised in the premises, and good cause 
appearing, now, therefore, the court hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On April 29, 1982, FLP entered into a Concessionaire's 
Lease with the United States of America, Department of the 
Interior to act as a concessionaire on United States government 
property. This property is located at Callville Bay in the 
Lake Mead National Recreation area, within the State of Nevada. 
2. Paragraph 20 of the Department of Interior Lease pro-
vided the United States Secretary of the Interior with the 
option of requiring a completion bond for any construction work 
performed on their leased Callville Bay property. 
3. The United States Secretary of the Interior did not, 
at any time, require a completion bond for any work relating to 
the Callville Bay Marina. 
4. The only third party benefits claimed by Neilson and 
Astro under the Department of Interior lease were those alleged-
ly provided under paragraph 20 of the lease. 
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5. On December 14, 1934, FLP entered into a General 
Construction Contract with Marinas Internationale., a ^  ? irginia 
corporation, for construction of a marina on Callville Bay, 
I *ake Me •. Nevada. 
6. The base dollar amount for the construction of the 
marina per the General Contract between FLP and Marinas 
Internationale was $2, The General Contract also 
contained a mechanism whereby Marinas Internationale was to be 
paid an amount for anchoring the dock system, based upon actual 
cost, but not to exceed $101,740.00. 
7. The General Contract between FLP and Marinas 
Internationale provided that the marina was to be completed no 
later than June 12, 1985. 
8. On March 1, 1985, Marinas Internationale entered into 
a subcontract with Neilson, entitled "Installat-1 on Contract", 
whereby plaintiff was to perform services relative to the con-
struction of the marina. 
9. The Installation Contract between Marinas 
Internationale and Neilson required Marinas Internationale to 
pay $150,696.00 for the installation of the dock, which was 
based on a price of $1.75 per square foot : / - ... .quare 
feet of dock. The Installation Contract further required 
Neilsor ,/" s *ork t< ) be completed by May 31, 1985, incorporated by 
reference the provisions of the contract between FLP and 
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Marinas Internationale, and required Neilson to be bound 
thereby. 
10. On March 11, 1985, Neilson began to perform as subcon-
tractor at Callville Bay in the assembling and construction of 
the marina"s floating dock system. 
11. On March 28, 1985, a change order to the contract 
between Marinas Internationale and Neilson was issued requiring 
Neilson to fabricate and provide certain anchor blocks on the 
marina at an additional cost to Marinas Internationale of 
$41,211.00 
12. Beginning with the original down payment in December 
of 1984, and continuing through February, March, April, May and 
to June 10, 1985, FLP paid a total of $2,109,168.50 to Marinas 
Internationale for materials and labor involved in the construc-
tion of the marina. 
13. On June 13, 1985, Marinas Internationale, the general 
contractor, filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code. FLP had no prior knowledge or warning 
of this action. 
14. After the bankruptcy filing, Neilson refused to 
perform further work unless some measures were taken to ensure 
payment to him for such work. On June 21, 1985, a joint 
accommodation was reached among Neilson, FLP, and Marinas 
Internationale whereby Neilson would be paid by joint check 
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(pay ab 1 e t o Ne i 1 s on an d Mar inas Int e rnat: i ona 1 e) based upon t ime 
and material invoices to be submitted. Neilson proceeded and 
continued to perform work on this basis until August 26, 1985, 
when he was ousted frwm the project lor nonpayment id State 
insurance fees. 
15. On July 9, 1985, a severe storm arose in the Lake Mead 
area and extensively damaged the marina, which was still under 
construction at the time. 
16. On July 15th, FLP met with Neilson and discussed storm 
damage repair work. Prior to the storm, FLP had paid a total 
of $52,132.70 in joint checks to Marinas Internationale/ 
Neilson. 
17. On August 26, 1985, Neilson was ordered to cease per-
forming construction work in Nevada by the State Industrial 
Insurance System of Nevada for nonpayment of insurance pre- • 
miums. Thereafter, the remaining marina construction and storm 
damage repair work was completed by FLP usina its own work 
forces. 
18. On October 26, 1985, the Department of the Interior 
acknow] edged complet ion and gave approval to open approximately 
one-half of the slips at the Callville Bay marina. 
19. On January 6, 1986, the Department of the Interior, 
N'a tiona ] Park: Ser /i ce acknowledged completi on of and gave its 
approval to open the completed marina. 
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20. FLP suffered significant economic loss in the form of 
additional project completion expenses and lost profits from 
slip rentals and other sources. 
21. In addition to payments for storm damage repair, FLP 
paid the following amounts for the construction of the Marina: 
$2,109,168.50 Total of checks paid to Marinas 
Internationale prior to the bankruptcy 
filing. 
52,132.70 Total of joint checks paid prior to the 
storm of 7/9/85 
70,000.00 Paid to Jessop Bros. Construction Co. 
for erection of Marina roof. 
36,000.00 Paid by FLP to B&C Steel for the final 
truck load of steel. 
$2,267,301.20 Total paid by FLP for completion of 
Marina, exclusive of payments for storm 
damage. 
22. The agreement between FLP and Marinas Internationale 
contained provisions for the benefit of materialmen such as 
intervenor Astro Steel and such persons were intended third 
party beneficiaries of said contract. 
23. The damages sustained by Astro Steel which are 
supported by the evidence amount to the sum of $101,300.00, 
together with prejudgment interest thereon. 
24. Pursuant to the provisions of the agreement between 
FLP and Marinas Internationale, FLP is entitled to liquidated 
damages thereunder for late/noncompletion of the marina 
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construction project, which, together with the economic loss 
set forth in Finding of E act 20 (above), more than offset the 
damage sustained by Astro Steel. 
From the foregoing f i ndi i igs of fa :: 1: 11 Ie coui: t draws the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA^f 
1. A binding contract existed between defendant FLP and 
the United States Department of Interior 
2. A binding contract existed between FLP and Marinas 
Internationale. 
3. A binding contract existed between Marinas 
Internationale and Neilson. 
4. Any rights and 'oi : obiigati ons which existed between 
FLP and Neilson were covered by express written agreements 
which preclude any recovery by Neilson based upon a theory of 
unjust enrichment. 
5. The record contains insufficient evidence for the 
court to determine damages attributable to a claim of unjust 
enrichment by Neilson. 
6. FLP paid a substantial sum for completion of the 
Callville Bay marina and therefore has not been unjustly 
enriched by either Neilson or Astro. 
J Under the terms of the Installation Contract, Neilson 
agreed t:o assi i in,e a] ] 11 ie obligations t:hat Mari nas Intei:nat:Iona 1 e 
had to FLP. The defenses and liquidated damages available to 
FLP under the General Contract excuse FLP from any perform-
ance or obligation to Neilson as a third party beneficiary and 
preclude any recovery by Neilson. 
8. Both Neilson and Astro, by claiming third party bene-
ficiary status, assume the rights and obligations of Marinas 
Internationale and subject themselves to all defenses available 
to FLP under the terms of the General Contract. Marinas 
Internationale is in material breach of the General Contract 
entered into with FLP. FLP is thereby excused from any further 
performance. Therefore, neither Neilson nor Astro may recover 
as third party beneficiaries to the general contract. 
9. The liquidated and other damages available to FLP 
under the general contract offset any third party benefits 
claimed by Astro. 
10. Defendant should be awarded a judgment in its favor 
and against both plaintiff and intervener in accordance 
herewith. 
DATED this /Q day of September J 1967. 
?imothy R. Hanson 
'District Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HiNOUcY 
Deptftv Clerfc^ 
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APPROVE! i >US I'O FORM: 
MUELLER, BARRIOS & CHRISTIANSEN 
_ P - c 
amos/PLc. 
rneys fpr Intervenor 
MADDOX & SNUFFER 
By AJL ?^7 
Petersor 
for Plaintiff 
SCMGAH39 
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ADDENDUM 3 
Court's Ruling of June 16, 1987, (On Rule 4Kb) Utah R. Civ. 
P. Motion to Dismiss) 
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2 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
RONALD K. NEILSON, dba 
MARINA MECHANICS ENTERPRISES, 
and ASTRO STEEL CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
(Intervenor), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS, 
INC. INCORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
CiVil No. C85-6367 
Judge's Ruling 
June 16,1987 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled cause 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson, a Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on the 16th day of June, 1987, at 
10:00 a.m., and that the following proceedings were had. 
! 5 K > t T? *V i& * 
0006^7 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Edwin T. Peterson 
MADDOX & SNUFFER 
64 East 6400 South, Suite 120 
Murray, Utah 84107 
FOR THE INTERVENOR: Ray Barrios 
MUELLER, BARRIOS & CHRISTIANSEN 
Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple, Suite 777 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: George A. Hunt 
and Ryan Tibbitts 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP 
2 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Thank you. Well, gentlemen, I 
think I'm prepared at this point to rule on the motions 
On some of the aspects. I might need the lunch hour to 
work on some others. Rule 4IB in the case tried to the 
bench, a motion for involuntary dismissal after the 
plaintiffs case, is treated as you're all aware a little 
differently. And I basically say this for the benefit of 
the parties who might not be familiar with Rule 41B. 
It's treated differently than if there is a jury that's 
finding the facts, because the court sits as the finder 
of fact as well as the determiner of the law, and plays 
that dual role. 
i 
And so the traditional statement that if there is 
any question of fact, and a prima facie case set out, et 
cetera, et cetera, at this point in time the court has 
the ability, and properly so, to determine whether or not 
I'm convinced that — and decide the case on the merits 
based on just the evidence heard, if that can be done. 
Now, that doesn't mean I can ignore the evidence that 
I've heard by any matter of means. But I can determine 
what the facts are to the extent that I have had evidence 
in front of me. 
And I think I can rule on some of the motions — 
some of the portions of the motion at this point in time. 
Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP 
3 
7 
11 
*
 ]
 Let's take the easy one first, and that fs the 
2
 I tortious interference claim sought by the plaintiff. I 
3
 J think everybody agrees that there is nothing there-
4 ]
 There is no evidence that's been offered to suggest that 
5 I there's been any tortious interference. No proof has 
6
 J been offered, and that must fail as a matter law at this 
point in time. And I agree with Mr. Hunt, that there is 
8 J an absolute privilege to interfere in a contract where 
9 you have an economic interest. And so even if there was 
10 J proof offered, which there was not, of some interference 
on the part of Forever Living Products and the other 
12 I contracts between the various parties that amounted to 
13 some type of tortious interference, there is an absolute 
14 privilege, so that claim is dismissed. 
15 Let's talk about the negligence claims as they are 
16 asserted next. I'm not willing to say at this point in 
17 j time that the evidence convinces me one way or the other, 
when I take the documentary evidence as well as the oral 
19 I testimony, that there has been no proof offered that 
20 there might be a breach, or that a duty existed. But I 
21 am of the opinion that the controlling law in this case 
22 is Nevada law. 
23 There is absolutely no reason to apply Utah law, if 
24 it's different. The law that should be applied under the 
25 traditional evaluation under a conflicts of law approach 
18 
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is Nevada in this case. And as I look at the Nevada 
cases, it clearly says that economic loss is not 
available in a negligence theory• So feven if I assume 
that I would be willing to say after I examined all the 
evidence that there was a duty created by these various 
contracts, or in some other fashion that rises to a 
negligence claim, this case is clearly an economic loss, 
and it can't be anything else. 
And the case that was suggested by Mr, Barrios, it 
dealt with property. And property was the object. But 
here it's economic loss, and that's what breach of 
contract claims are all about. If you have an economic 
loss, then those are traditionally and rightfully so, 
either statutory or contract law, but not in negligence. 
That's a tort. And in this case economic loss cannot be 
recooped in a negligence case that is — that is really 
nothing other than the claimed breach of a duty, which is 
a tort. 
So to the extent that the negligence claims are 
asserted, while I want the record to be clear on this, 
I'm not saying that a duty has not been shown, because 
I'm not convinced one way or the other at this point on 
that. I am satisfied that even if the duty was shown, 
this case could not stand in negligence, because it's an 
economic loss case, and that's not available in the 
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 negligence theory. And so I dismiss the negligence 
2
 claims as well for those reasons. 
3
 J With regard to the oral contracts, gentlemen, I hear 
cases day after day after day that deal with oral 
5
 | contracts, and they are usually in business settings just 
6
 like this. And so I am familiar with — and have to deal 
7
 frequently with oral contracts. And it always pains me 
8
 to have to try and determine those, because it would have 
9
 been so easy to put it in writing. And that's the reason 
10 J that the law deals with — has a number of things that 
the court must take into account in deciding whether or 
12 I not an oral contract exists, and not the least of which 
13 is the statute of frauds. 
14
 I And the statute of frauds in this state and others 
says that if you want to hold somebody else for a — for 
the debt of another, you've got to have it in writing. 
15 
16 
1? I And to the extent that the plaintiff claims that Forever 
18
 I Living Products in the meeting in July, early part of 
19 I July, promissed to make sure that Mr. Neilsen recooped 
20 his losses, you can look at that any direction you want 
21 J to look at it, but it's still a promise to pay for 
someone else's obligation. And that's exactly the way 
23 I these folks were looking at it. 
24 And frankly gentlemen, it's a lot of lawyers1 talk 
25 at this point in time now that the case is here to 
22 
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1
 I suggest something else. Mr. Neilsen expected to get paid 
2
 ' by Marinas International. He now knew they were in 
bankruptcy. He wasn't going to get paid by them. And if 
in fact the conversation took place as he suggested, then 
5
 I he was relying upon Forever Living Products to pay that 
6
 J obligation to recoop his losses, whatever that means. 
And so if there was an oral contract with regard to 
8
 I Neilsen, it had to be for the debt of another, and it's 
9
 not in writing, and it's barred by the statutes of fraud. 
10 I Additionally, and this is equally as important, the 
the Supreme Court of various states, including Utah, has 
12
 I said that you can't enforce an oral contract unless it's 
13 J definite enough so that you'll know what the terms of it 
are. In other words, a vague agreement that is so 
11 
14 
15
 J unspecific so as to be unenforceable cannot be enforced 
16
 I in an oral agreement. And this just g^ts back to the — 
17
 ] it's just good business sense to have writings, and 
18
 ' people don't find themselves in these positions. 
19
 | But I can't enforce that contract. I don't know 
20
 I what recoop his losses means, even if it occured. And at 
21
 I this stage of the proceedings, that's all the evidence 
there is. And I don't have to decide whether whether it 
23 I was really said or it wasn't said. But taking the 
24
 j evidence the way it was, Mr. Neilsen, the only thing he's 
been able to say, and I appreciate the parties' candor in 
22 
25 
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1
 this case, but, is that Forever Living Products quote, 
2
 J "promissed to recoop his losses." Promissed to allow him 
to recoop his losses. And I don't have — I couldn't 
enforce that, not in good conscience, because I wouldn't 
5
 know what number to put on it. 
6
 And if I put the $240,000 figure on it that Marinas 
7
 International was supposed to pay, then it's answering 
8 for the debt of another, clearly. So I can't enforce an 
9
 I oral contract that one in particular, that is so vague 
10 | and so indefinite that I don't know it's terms, because I 
11 wouldn't know what to tell the defendant to pay. It 
12 would just be sheer speculation. And the same is true 
13 with the agreement in August. 
14
 I have trouble with Mr. Taylor's testimony, because 
15 he did testify, at least in my judgement, in different 
16 ways on different occasions. And perhaps the reason he 
17 suggested, that he was tired, and it was a long day is 
18
 the reason for that. But that doesn't explain, 
19 unfortunately, why that was not added to, or why that 
20 clarity was not made when the deposition was read. 
21 But even if I take what was said on the witness 
22 stand today, the same problem exists with regard to the 
23 August meeting. It's so indefinite, and so vague that I 
24 J can't hold the defendant on an oral contract for that 
25 claim that we're going to pay the balance due after 
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1
 Marinas International is now in bankruptcy and sells some 
2
 J licorice factory. There is just nothing there — nothing 
that rises to the level of what the law is going to 
impose an obligation on a party who does not agree that 
5
 I there was an oral contract. And I think the law is 
pretty clear on that. 
With regard to the portions of the contract where 
8
 I Mr. Neilsen claims that there is still some amounts owing 
9 
11 
as a result of — I forgot the exhibit number, but itfs 
10
 I the letter that is really in my judgement an estimate of 
what's going to occur in the future, I don't really see 
12
 I anything inconsistent about that. What I see is an 
13
 I agreement to continue on basically a cost plus situation, 
14
 | submit the bills as they come along, do the work that 
15
 I changed to storm damage. But Mr. Hunt is correct. The 
16 only evidence before me is that by the time Mr. Neilsen 
left the job, and left the job I might add not at the 
fault of Forever Living Products, because those were 
amounts that were not paid long before this bankruptcy 
ever occured on workmen's comp premiums, and that's the 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21
 | reason that he was forced off the job by officials in 
22
 I Nevada, between the time he started the work, and between 
23 I the time he left the job, he basically put it back in the 
24 condition it was before the storm, and he got paid for 
25 it. 
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When the agreement says that you have — that the 
payroll is going to be in a range, and here's the rest of 
the bill, and you submit the payroll each and every week, 
and you get paid for what you submit, and you get paid 
for what is on the estimate in addition, and there is no 
evidence to the contrary that he wasn't paid all those 
amounts, he got paid everything he was entitled to. Now, 
if it had of gone on in the future, that would be 
something else. But Mr. Neilsen was forced off the job, 
not at the expense, or — well, expense is the wrong 
word, forced off the job, but not because of the fault of 
anything Forever Living Products did. 
I know he said that the bill had to be paid. It 
wasn't their responsibility to pay it. That was back 
long before there ever was a bankruptcy, and Marinas 
International got everybody in trouble. 
So I can't enforce any of these oral promises, even 
to the extent that they exist. They are too vague and 
too indefinite. I'm also satisfied that to the extent a 
contract was created by the estimate that was signed by I 
believe it was Mr. Ham on behalf of Forever Living 
Products for the work that went on after July, that Mr. 
Neilsen has recieved everything that he is entitled to. 
I'm not as clear, gentlemen, and I'm not willing at 
this point in time, because I don't feel that I have — 
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while I've looked at them, I don't ffeel that I've studied 
the contracts clear enough, and have them in mind to the 
extent that I'm ready to rule at this stage of the 
proceedings, even if there is no othfer evidence, it 
doesn't make any difference, I'm still not ready to rule 
on the questions of quantum meruit, and third party 
beneficiary, except to the extent that the third party 
beneficiary claims are based on oral contracts. 
Those must be dismissed, because I find there are no 
oral contracts, at least none that the law is willing to 
enforce. 
So here's what we'll do, gentlemen. Take the noon 
hour, give some thought to my rulings at this point in 
time, and let's see where we are wiph regard to further 
evidence, whether or not that may be necessary, and what 
claims still remain, and we'll talk about them further 
after lunch. I'll see you back here at 1:30. We'll be 
in recess. 
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of the State of Utah; that on the 16th day of June, 1987, 
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the proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my said 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
RONALD K. NEILSON, dba 
MARINA MECHANICS ENTERPRISES, 
and ASTRO STEEL CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
(Intervenor), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS, 
INC. INCORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. C85-6367 
Judge's Ruling 
July i,1987 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled cause 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson, a Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on the 1st day of July, 1987, at 
10:00 a.m., and that the following proceedings were had. 
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 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2
 THE COURT: The record will show we continue in 
3
 Nielsen and others is versus Forever Living Products 
4 
C85-6367. The record will show that all counsel are 
5
 present, and some of the parties are present. The record 
6
 will further reflect this is the time set for ruling on 
7
 the remaining issues in this case. 
8 Gentlemen, since we broke at noon in addition to 
9
 | getting some lunch, and taking care of another short 
10 matter, I spent the remaining portion Iof the time on this 
11 case to give some additional consideration to not only 
12 your supplemental briefs, but the arguments that you all 
13 presented at the time — this morning> closing arguments. 
14
 Ifve tried to look at the matter in some detail, and 
15 all the issues you've raised, and gave them all some 
16 thought to reaching a decision in this case. 
17 I want you all to know that I reinforce what I said 
18 as we closed. I think you all did an excellent job on 
19 briefing the court on the various legal issues involved, 
20 and presenting your cases. Unfortunately this is one of 
21 those cases that it's difficult not ohly from the 
22
 parties' standpoint, they are all it difficult from that 
23 standpoint, but the court's standpoint because the real 
24 person — real entity that ought to be here, and who 
25 should be responsible for all the claims that have been 
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asserted is not, and that's Marinas International. And 
they filed bankruptcy, and whether we like it or whether 
we don't, the federal bankruptcy laws prohibit them from 
having to respond at least directly in this jurisdiction 
in this suit. Perhaps they'll respond somewhere else 
another day, but not today. 
So that makes it difficult, because basically what 
we're considering is in one degree or another, looking at 
who should bear the loss amoung the various parties who 
are still viable entities, and not in bankruptcy. 
So with that comment in mind, let me get back to the 
issues. There is really no question about it, there are 
two theories that are being asserted by both the 
plaintiff, and the plaintiff in intervention that the 
court has considered not only while we were in recess at 
the close of the evidence last two weeks, but also this 
afternoon. And those are the third party beneficiary 
theories, and the unjust enrichment theories. 
I don't think there is — I don't think anybody 
really argues that those theories are mutually exclusive. 
If there is a third party beneficiary, and there is a 
contract upon which the third party beneficiary might 
lie, of course there can not be unjust enrichment. The 
law is clear you can't have — obviously so, you can't 
have a contract implied in law if in fact there is a 
Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP 
4 
4 
1
 contract. 
2
 So I think everybody agrees to that. But I want the 
3
 I record to reflect that. I've tried to make some notes of 
the various theories, and let me deal first with the 
5
 plaintiff Nielsen, Marine Mechanic's claim of third party 
6
 beneficiary. So that you understand, gentlemen, it's not 
7
 J my intent to cover everything that's been said during the 
8 course of this trial, and closing arguments, or we'd be 
9
 here for another five days, but merely to hit upon those 
10 | points. And the reason I like to rul^ from the bench is 
n because I think the attorneys and parties are entitled to 
12 know what's going through my mind, and I like to go on 
13 J the record as opposed to some written document that may 
or may not encompass what I think ought to be said for a 
number of reasons, not the least of which is the support 
16 facilities we have to do that and the time constraints. 
17I i don't have two or three law clerks, and multi-
18
 secretaries and things to do, and pl^s a case load of 
19 three or four hundred cases. 
20 so with those things in mind I think rulings from 
21 J the bench are better, and I try to do it, and I'll do it 
22
 | in this case. 
23 So with regard to plaintiff Marine Mechanic's third 
24 party beneficiary claim, it is without dispute that 
25 Marina Mechanics had a contract with the general 
14 
15 
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contractor, Marinas International, and that's Exhibit 3. 
And that contract was entitled Installation Contract, and 
it also developed into supplying some steel as well. But 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Installation Contract outlines the 
rights and obligations that rain between Marinas 
International, and Marina Mechanics. Plaintiff's Exhibit 
3 says in article 5A that Marina Mechanics agrees to be 
bound to Marinas International, and assume to Marinas 
International all the duties that Marinas International 
has to the owner, and that's Forever Living Products. 
So the long and the short of that agreement, and 
what Mr. Nielsen agreed to when he signed it is that he 
agrees to undertake all the obligations that Marinas 
International had to the owner, Forever Living Products. 
In other words, placed in the position — in the shoes of 
Marinas International. Whether he intended to or not is 
not the point. The point is he did it in this 
Installation Contract, so apparently he could get the 
contract to do this job. 
When this thing started, nobody suspected it was 
going to go awry. So with respect to Marina Mechanics by 
it's own contract, it's agreed to assume all Marinas 
International's obligations towards Forever Living 
Products. And to the extent that that has occured, and 
it has occured by the terms of the contract, Marina 
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1
 Mechanics must therefore stand responsible for any 
2
 defenses that might be raised for Marinas Internationalfs 
3
 J breachs to Forever Living Products. 
It fs not a matter of whether or not the law requires 
5
 that. I111 deal with that later when I talk about Astro 
6
 Steel. As far as Marina Mechanics is concerned, they've 
7
 agreed to do that by contract under Plaintiff's Exhibit 
8 I 3. And clearly those breachs are numerous, and Mr. Hunt 
9
 enumerated some of them that were found in the evidence, 
10 and I likewise find that, not the least was which not 
11 finishing the project on time or for that matter at all. 
12 The liquidated damage comes in, the additional 
13 expenses to complete the project, loss of rents, and 
14 other profits that were discussed by the witnesses, if 
15 not in some specific detail, I believe they were specific 
16 enough so that I can rely upon them, ithere was a 
17 substantial amount that Forever Living Products lost as a 
18
 result of Marinas International's breaqhs, numerous in 
19 number. 
20 And so because Marina Mechanics has agreed to stand 
21 for those if it claims third party beneficiary under that 
22 contract, by it's own agreement, it has agreed to stand 
23 in the shoes of Marinas International. And where those 
24 breachs have occured, Forever Living Products is not only 
25 excused from performance, but the offsets and defenses 
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would prohibit any recovery on third party beneficiary in 
that regard. 
And that is especially true when you examine 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 further under article 5 subpart (I) 
Marina Mechanics agrees that the obligations under 
article 5, which include payment to Marina Mechanics from 
Marinas International, do not create any obligation on 
the part of the owner to pay Marina Mechanics, So even 
if the defenses and setoffs and excuses from performance 
that Forever Living Products was entitled to assert 
against Marinas International were not enforceable 
against Marina Mechanics, certainly the agreement on the 
part of Marina Mechanics not to look towards the owner 
prohibits them from asserting any third party claim or 
any claim at all based on the contracts. 
Based upon that, it's the court's conclusion that 
the law in this case, as well as the facts, and the facts 
really aren't disputed in this case in any substantial 
amounts, but generally the facts are disputed, there can 
be no third party action on the part of Marina Mechanics 
against Forever Living Products under the contract 
Exhibit D40 which is the agreement between Forever Living 
Products and Marinas International. 
To the extent that there is still being a claim 
asserted, no one except Mr. Hunt really addressed it, but 
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1
 just so the record is clear, to the extent there is a 
2
 third party claim — third party beneficiary claim under 
3
 J the contract between Forever Living Products and the 
Department of Interior on the bond issue, the evidence is 
5
 undisputed that the provisions in that agreement 
6
 requiring a bond were never required, and therefore that 
7
 created no benefit under which either for that matter 
8 Astro or Marina Mechanics could make a claim for a third 
9
 party beneficiary claim. So there is no third party 
10 beneficiary claim there. 
11 So on that issue I find against Marina Mechanics and 
12 in favor of Forever Living Products. Qn the unjust 
i 
13 enrichment claim, as I've indicated, there cannot be a 
1^  contract implied in law if there is a contract in fact. 
15 There was a contract in fact here between Marina 
16 Mechanics and Marinas International, and to a substantial 
n extent the contract was substantial, Exhibit D40, the 
18 contract between Marinas International, and Forever 
19 Living Products was incorporated into Exhibit P3, so 
20 there was a written agreement. 
21 So for that reason alone, there can be no unjust 
22 enrichment. But rather than just resolve it on the basis 
23 of what one might view to be a technicality, I!ve 
24 considered it further. And after I've gone through the 
25 effort to try this case I think you ought to know what I 
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think about the equity position as well. Even if there 
were not a bar because there is a written agreement, I am 
not satisfied that elements of unjust enrichment as far 
as Marina Mechanics is concerned has been proven. The 
burden of proof does rest upon the parties asserting the 
claim in this case and that's the plaintiffs, the 
plaintiffs and plaintiffs in intervention. I can see 
under the general facts of this case as they relate to 
Marina Mechanics and Forever Living Products, I can see 
no reason in equity that I ought to shift the burden of 
responsibility to pay in this case. 
It's unfortunate that Forever Living Products has 
paid already once, and it's unfortunate that Marinas 
International did not pay Marina Mechanics, but I can see 
no reason to shift that burden to Forever Living Products 
in this particular case, particularly when you take a 
look at what was going on. Marina Mechanics was on the 
site. Marina Mechanics knew what was going on. They had 
firsthand knowledge. They knew what materials were being 
delivered, at least had a better opportunity than Forever 
Living Products. They agreed that there may be double 
shifts, and that ultimately happened. There were some 
late payments, and some problems with payment that Mr. 
Nielsen experienced from Marinas International, and he 
was aware of that. He was aware of the problems with 
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work was progressing, subcontractor is getting paid, and 
1
 J payroll and so on through the month of May, at least 
2 !
 through the latter part of May, 
3
 I I also note that he made a claim for not in his 
4 i . 
individual capacity but as Marina Mechanics, made a claim 
5
 | for materials in 25 that in fact had not even been 
delivered. On the other hand, you have Forever Living 
Products who has a contract with the general who is 
8
 I supposed to oversee this project, and see that — and see 
9
 J on behalf of the owner, part of the agreement, that the 
10 
11
 I all those things that are encompassed in Exhibit D40, the 
12 I contract between the two. 
13 J And absent something extraordinary that should draw 
it to the attention of Forever Living Products, some 
serious problems on the part of the general contractor, 
Marinas International to do what they are supposed to do, 
17
 | until the bankruptcy occured, and I think it's undisputed 
18
 i that no one realized the bankruptcy was coming except 
19 I Marinas International, I can see no reason to shift the 
20 burden of proof in equity. 
21 Finally, I think I need to make A comment with 
22
 regard to damages claimed under the unjust enrichment 
23 theory by Marina Mechanics. As I look through the 
24 J evidence, while there has been evidence in Exhibit P25 
that suggests what was being claimed, there is no way 
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that I can determine between or in Exhibit 25 what 
damages might be attributable to a claim under the 
contract or claim outside the contract, that is unjust 
enrichment. 
And while I understand it would be difficult to 
prove, the law is clear in my judgement, that difficulty 
of proof does not relieve the party responsible for 
making that proof, in this case the plaintiff, from that 
obligation. 
And there is one final thing that I think is 
important with regard to unjust enrichment. And I donft 
know that Nevada has specifically addressed this, and 
Nevada law does control, but where the owner has paid for 
the work in it's entirety, and I find that Forever Living 
Products did pay for the work in it's entirety, the 
Nevada courts, and I'm bound by Nevada courts whether I 
agree with it or not, they say you don't have to pay 
twice. And I can find nothing, and there has been no 
authority suggested that — other than the fact that we 
may not like it, and that isn't a good enough reason, to 
suggest that under the facts of this case, even if there 
was a somewhat premature payment on the part of Forever 
Living Products of the full contract price that that 
should change the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court 
of the state of Nevada, which says you don't pay twice 
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1
 under unjust enrichment claims under circumstances like 
2
 this. 
3
 I I think the cases that are cited ^rom the 
defendant's brief, there is the Joseph case, and the 
5
 Bowyer case are despositive of the issue of unjust 
6
 enrichment, and also despositive with the situation with 
7
 | regard to third party beneficiary. So on both the claims 
8 that are asserted by Marina Mechanics against the 
9
 i defendant I find those issues against the plaintiff, and 
10 j in favor of the defendant, Forever Livina Products, no 
11 cause of action. 
12 With regard to the plaintiff in intervention, Astro 
13 Steel, the evidence that I've heard in this case are in a 
14 distinctly different position than Marina Mechanics. 
15 First let me take up the issue of unjust enrichment. 
16 There was no written contract, so I cannot say that there 
17 could be no contract implied in law because there was a 
18
 written contract, because there was not a written 
19 contract. And but for the fact that Forever Living 
20 Products has paid out the full contract price, and as 
21 I've indicated, I find that to be the case, paid out more 
22 than the full contract price as a matter of fact, the 
23 equity would place Astro in a different position. 
24 As I've indicated, Nevada law says that once the 
25 owner has paid the full amount, thut there can be no 
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recovery in unjust enrichment. And the cases I've 
indicated say that, as I cited with regard to Marina 
Mechanics' claims, the ones cited in Mr. Hunt's brief. I 
just can't find a legal reason to carve out an exception 
because of premature payment. If there is one, I have 
not been cited any authority that would suggest that's 
correct, nor am I able to find any in the time that I've 
had available to look. 
So there can no exception, I choose not for carve 
one out on my own volition. So therefore with regard to 
the plaintiff in intervention's claim on unjust 
enrichment I must find in favor of the defendant, and 
against plaintiff in intervention Astro on that issue. 
With regard to Astro Steel's third party beneficiary 
claim, there is no question in my mind that the contract 
Exhibit D4 0 between Marinas International, and Forever 
Living Products deals with the benefits that run to 
materialmen, such as Astro Steel. I recognize the fact 
that Forever Living Products may not have been actually 
aware of Astro being involved in a specific fashion, but 
certainly they knew or should have been aware that 
someone was going to supply some steel to this project, 
and someone was supplying steel for the roofing. 
As a matter of fact they paid for it — paid for 
part of if. And in looking at the status of the law in 
Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP 
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 Nevada on what must be proven for a third party 
2 beneficiary such as Astro in this case, it appears that 
3
 I those general elements have been met. And that Astro 
does fall into the category of a third party beneficiary 
5 to the contract between Marinas International, and 
6
 Forever Living Products. 
7
 There is only one — and if that's where it ended, I 
8 would find in favor of Astro Steel, and I'll talk about 
9 the damages and improving in a moment. But if that's 
10 j where it ended, Astro would be entitled to recover the 
11 I damages they have proven. But as I read through the 
12 briefs again this afternoon, I noted that the cases cited 
13 by Mr. Hunt in his brief regarding Nevada law dealing 
14 with whether or not a third party beneficiary must assume 
15 and stand in the shoes absent a contract — Marina 
16 Mechanics of course agreed to do that by contract — but 
17 I absent a contract, whether or not a third party 
18 beneficiary would have to stand in the shoes of a 
19 i defaulting party to the contract they are seeking the 
20 benefit from, it appears to me that Nevada law says you 
21 must. And those cases are cited on page 7 of Mr. Hunt's 
22 supplemental brief, the Morelli case, and the Britton 
23 versus Groom case, and the Gibbs versus Giles case. 
24 I've seen no authority that would suggest that that 
25 is not the law in the state of Nevada, which is 
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applicable to this case. And so accordingly the same 
reasoning applies as to Marina Mechanics as applies to 
Astro Steel under that case law, at least it's been cited 
to me, and as I read the quotes from the Nevada Supreme 
Court, as well as the Nevada Supreme Court citation of 
approval of an Oklahoma case that deals with that issue. 
Those defenses again raise the question of liquidated 
damages, raise the question of late and no completion, 
and all those other matters that have been discussed. 
And not only does that relieve Forever Living Products 
from obligations to perform under that contract, then 
that would be payment. Those defenses would clearly 
offset the damages that have been proven by Astro on the 
steel that was delivered. 
Let me speak to that briefly so that it's clear how 
I reached that conclusion. I'm satisfied that Astro has 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the value 
of the product that they delivered, the second steel, 
less the last truck load was $101,300. I'm also 
satisfied that they've proven that they are entitled to 
prejudgement interest, but only at statutory rate. There 
being no evidence of what the statutory rate is in the 
State of Nevada, I think the rules of law require me to 
assume that the prejudgement interest rate in the State 
of Nevada would be the same as it is in the State of 
Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP 
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2
 While no one has briefed that, I believe that to be 
3
 J the law. The fact that only the owner of Astro Steel 
testified to that amount, and he said this is my invoice, 
5
 J I think I can draw from that a reasonable inference that 
6
 that is the reasonable value of that steel. There was 
7
 much discussion at the hearing, or much evidence, and 
8 much discussion about what damages went beyond that, and 
9
 I there was testimony as I recall regarding the fact there 
10 J hadn't been bonuses for the principles, and employees for 
some period of time; there had been interest on notes 
12 I that had been taken out to satisfactory a judgement, 
13 interest on the judgement that the supplier to Astro had 
14 claimed; that there were ongoing leasing costs, there 
15 were no raises, equipment needed updating, a lot of 
16 
18 
generalities that were discussed, but 
17 i the form of specific dollar amounts. 
I heard nothing in 
And absent some special expertise from the owner, I 
19 I think proof in that regard to satisfy me that there were 
20 some additional consequential damages that Astro had 
21 shown beyond the $101,3 00, there would have to be either 
22 an accountant or someone who could come down and 
I 
23 translate all those things into dollars, and that did not 
24 occur. So I'm not satisfied that proof was met on those 
25 points. 
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So that the record is clear, the only damages that I 
could find that have been proved by the requisite 
standard of proof were the $101,300 plus the prejudgement 
interest, and those are all offset by just liquidated 
damages. That doesn't count the other matters that 
Nevada law seems to say that Astro Steel must accept all 
the bad along with the good in the contract. And there 
is some merit to that position. If you're going to 
accept the benefits of the contract, then perhaps you 
ought to take the distasteful portions along with it. 
But in any event, whether I agree with that or not 
is irrelevant. Nevada Supreme Court so indicated, and 
I'm bound by that. So accordingly, even though otherwise 
I'm of the opinion that third party beneficiary status 
should be allowed to Astro Steel because of those 
defaults on the part of Marinas International of the 
contract under which they claim third party beneficiary 
status does not allow recover, and I find on both the 
unjust enrichment and the third party beneficiary in 
favor of the defendant, and against Astro Steel. 
Mr. Hunt, I'm going to ask you to prepare the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on all the 
issues, of course. We need to deal differently with the 
court's order on the rule 4IB motion. I did rule on 
those, on the merits, although I don't know that that 
Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP 
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1
 will entail a lot of Findings of Fact, but to the extent 
2
 Findings of Fact are necessary, and they are required 
3
 J under that rule, that will be appropriate, the questions 
of law as to whether or not there was a cause of action, 
5
 I specifically the negligence claim. 
6
 We need to deal with those so it's clear in the 
7
 J Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the ones 
8 that address the 4IB motion and the two remaining issues, 
9
 the Findings and Conclusions and the judgement on the 
10 j unjust enrichment and the third party beneficiary. All 
11 right. Anything I have neglected to cover? 
12 MR. HUNT: No, Your Honor. 
13 I THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, BUNNY CAROL NEUENSCHWANDER, do hereby 
certify: 
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
License No, 152, and one of the official court reporters 
of the State of Utah; that on the 1st day of July, 19 87, 
I attended the within matter and reported in shorthand 
the proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my said 
shorthand notes to be transcribed into typewriting, and 
the foregoing pages, numbered from 3 to 19, inclusive, 
constitute a full, true and correct account of the same 
to the best of my ability. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 11th day of 
July, 1987 
BUNNY CI 
My Commission Exj 
December 5, 1987 
)L NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR, CP' 
res: 
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ADDENDUM 5 
General Contract between FLP and Marinas Internationale, 
dated December 14, 1984 (Trial Exhibit D-40) 
SALIIS (CONTRJCCT * 
3ate 
BILLING INFOP^VTION 
?l"OieCt Name r n l h n l l P Rn Y Marinn 
"ustomer pnr^vpr Rp«nrt.« 
address m n n Mpvada Hyw ^nitp 907 
Jity Boulder Titrate
 Nv. Zip 33005 
Jountrv U S A 
Ship to 
Address 
city _L; 
Country 
Contact 
j Contract No-
SHIPPING INFORMATION 
Pnllville Jay Mnrina 
Hnv ion .Star Rt_ JD 
is Vprn.9 Stat? NV. Z iP 8912-
uaa 
Phone( ) 
____________—__________________ 
PRODUCT 
Marinas Internationale, Ltd. (Company) agrees to provide the following 
materials and equipment according to the attached specifications ar^ . 
marina plan entitled Cnllvillp Rav Marina - 12/7/84 (annrox.79,000 s 
ana in accordance with the WOHK AND DLiLIVtlRY SCMKDULE. ~*~" 
PRICE I 
The Customer agrees to pay for the following according to the PAYMENT 
SCHEDULE: 
Product 
Floating Docks: 
0Laminated marina decking, 
thickness to be 4 " 
P r i c p 
° P o l ' / e t h y l e n e p o n t o o n s , 
f r e e b o a r d t o be 1 6 " - 1 7 ' 
°Dock fonde r ( s p e c i f y ) 
0 P o l y u r e t h a n e foam 
° D o l t s , c l e a t s , 
p i l e g u i d e s 
°Othc r n e c e s s a r y h a r d w a r e , 
p e r p l a n 
(id'Kjways ( s p e c i f y ) : 
U t i l i t i e s : 
Anchor ing 
not 
Tr i t a l S 1 , 7 7 6 , 0 8 5 . 0 0 
O t h e r : Assembly & I n s t a l l a t i o n 
Hoof TSaoaicture p e r p l an 
not i n c l u d e d 
1 1 3 , 7 1 0 . 0 0 
—\-93rrWi Sn-«Q 
i n c l u d e d TOTAL $ 3 0 7 , 6 7 5 . 0 0 
F r e i g h t ( c i r c l e ) C . I . F . , C_F, K.O.B. 
Common C a r r i e r , F . 7 \ . S . , C . O . D . , £ t 
TOTAL 
i n c l u d e d 
$ 2 , 0 8 3 , 7 0 0 . 0 0 
C u s t o m e r a c r e e s t o p a y . a l l a w p l i c a b l o D e r m i t . f c o s d u t i e s and t a x e s , - -
w h e t h e r s a l e s , U S P 38a#err&GOi?prk\ -^YrV^ f ndon VA 22070 U S A „ 
e x c i s e o r o t h e r 7 0 3 / 6 ° 9 ' 2 o 0 ° T e l e x " 248762 M A R I N A UP Coble Mannas Int E X H I B I T A 
Concord. CA • Ff Myers. FL • Chicago. IL • SI Louis M p • New York. NY • Houston. TX 
Auslrclia • Schrair' • Hong Kong • Kuwait • Saudi Arcbbic • United Arab Emirotes 
-2-
Date December 10, 198U Project Name Callvllle Bay Marina 
3. WORK AND DELIVERY SCHEDULE 
Work Delivery 
Materials begin to arrive at 
job site within 30 days from contract execution 
Detail design complete and 
assembly begins ^5 days from contract execution 
Breakwater, C, D, and E piers 
rnmnlptpd to allow for boat 
rentals - (approx. 5/1 assuming 
12/12/8*4 contract execution) -
MI portion only. Does not 
account for utilities 
installation 150 days from contract execution 
-Final completion i acceptance 18_0 days from contract execution 
4 . PAYMENT SCHEDULE 
% Due Amount Due Upon These Conditions 
Materials : 
10? $188,979.50^ Initial deposit, indicating execution 
of contract 
90% $1 ,700,815.50 Due per payment terms as materials 
are delivered to Job site 
Total $1,889,7<*5.00 
- 3 -
Labor: 
90% 
10% 
Total 
$171,555.00 
$19,HO.00 
$193,865.00 
Due per terms as work in completed 
Due upon final completion 
Total amount of contract $2 ,083,760 .00 •( 
The Customer shall make progress payments to the Company as 
follows: 10% down with order and irrevocable letter of credit in favor 
of Marinas Internationale, Ltd, with authorized draws based on receipt 
of materials and work performed. The Customer will be Invoiced upon 
the Contractor issuing purchase orders. However, payment shall be due 
7 days after materials arrive on' site or upon arrival at a mutually 
agreed upon storage area, according to a statement of values which wll.' 
be issued at the time contractor Issues purchase- orders. If payment 1, 
delayed beyond ten (10) days of when due, the contract price snail, 
without prejudice to the Company's right to immediate payment, be 
increased by 1 1/2% per month on the unpaid balance, but not to exceed 
the maximum amount permitted by law. Owner agrees to provide bank 
references and/or financial statements as Company may require. All 
prices quoted are valid for ninety (90) dajys . 
5. DELAYS 
v. .The Company shall be excused for, delay' in performance due to any 
;cause beyond its control, including .tout";'-hbt/ limited to fire, flood, a< 
of God, war, act of government, act "or .orp^ ssion of Customer, strike_bj 
labor trouble. The time of performance/shall be extended for a time 
>e;qual to the period of the delay, and it^^S'nsequences^ 
- I I -
6. TITLE AND INSURANCE 
y Title to the products and 'risk of loss or damage shall pass to,/ 
Buyer upon tender of delivery, except that a security Interest in the i 
product or any replacement shall remain ^p Company, regardless of mode 
Of. attachment to realty or other property, until the full price has 
been paid in cash. Buyer agrees to do allnacts necessary.to perfect^j 
and maintain said security interest, andv;^ to protect Company's interest^ 
by .adequately insuring the product(s) against loss or damage from any / 
external cause with Company named as insured or..co-insured, _Marinas^ / 
Internationale agrees to pay the deductible for any such claims. / 
7. STORAGE COSTS 
Any part of the marina product which must be stored due to delay 
caused by the Customer will be placed in storage by the Company at cost 
and risk to the Customer 
8. WARRANTY 
The Company warrants to the Customer that the following materials 
supplied by the Company will be free from defects under normal use and 
service for a period of five (5) years from date of installation: 
fender, foam, bolts, cleats, anchoring guides, and a ten (10) year 
warranty on the pontoons* Company will furnl.-sh, repair or replace 
without cost to the Customer any part, assembly or portion thereof 
which shall be determined to be defective. The laminated plank carries 
a 30 year limited warranty against decay which Is provided by the 
manufacturer of the preservative treatment. Tin* Company provides a 5 
year warranty against defects in the laminated plank provided 
recommended maintenance is followed, (See Spec ifications for 
recommended maintenance details). The Company provides a 5 year 
warranty on the roof materials and design. Other, separately listed 
Items such as utilities products and components, gangways, pilings and 
other accessories shall be covered only by the express warranty of the 
manufacturer or supplier thereof. The Company will not be responsible 
for consequential or incidental damages. 
9. PENALTY 
Company agrees to accept penalty clause of $800.00 per day, 
$4,000*00 per week for delays in meeting performance schedule In 
accordance with paragraph 5 of contract, "DEJLAYS" . 
10. J3KCJUR_ITY .INTEREST 
The Company reserves and the Customeer grants to the Company a 
oecurity Interest in the marina materials and all proceeds thereof for 
the purpose of securing the balance of payments due under this 
Contract. The Customer agrees to sign any financing statements which 
the Company deems reasonably necessary to protect this Security 
Interest. The Company is also granted an Irrevocable power of attorney 
to execute such financing statements on the Customer's behalf. This 
Security Interest shall terminate when the bustoiner has satisfied all 
of its obligations under this Contract. 
11 . SITE PREPARATION 
Customer agrees to provide and prepare a s u u a m e assembly site 
for construction according to specification:* to he provided by Company, 
This site will include utilities and any special use permits, if 
- ( , -
needed. 
12. SHORESIDE COSTS 
Customer agrees to assume shoreslde and bulkhead preparation cost 
associated with installation, including utility services and gangway 
assembly. 
13. CHANGE ORDER 
Design alterations after (Purchaser's) approval of final pier and 
utility configuration will be done only through written change order. 
(Purchaser) may sub.nlt a request Vov change order detailing anticipatec 
or desired alteration. Marinas Internationale will then inform the 
Purchaser of the impacts, If any, of rhe proposed alteration on the 
cost and schedule of materials delivery. Acceptance, in writing, of 
these by (the Purchase]*) will constitute an approved change order and a 
contract modification. 
Ik. SALES CONTRACT SUPPLEMENT 
The Company and the Customer agr»'»: to the following additional 
contract terms and details: 
a. Customer to provide adequate sqju'rity and is responsible for i 
, loss due to theft or vandalism.'* Company.+ %$ responsible for loss duetto 
.^ »• -• •-»•- ..J»JV.I • • »"— - *~-**- ..,..•.- » • •*• 
damage during shipping, assembly and installation.^ 7 
b. Customer to provide electricity and lighting necessary to 
assemble during nighttime if needed to complete marina on schedule. 
c. Gale Drimhall or other personnel as approved by Customer to 
pt-rform monthly on-.;lU> Q.C. 1 nsport, 1 on during Installation. 
d. Company agrees to provide Customer* the marina anchoring system 
-7-
at coat in an effort to :;ave money. The price of $113,710.00 is 
Customer's estimated cost of the anchoring and agrees to pay to the 
Contractor any additional costs over $113,710.00 up to the amount of 
$215,^50.00. Contractor agrees to pay for any anchoring costs over 
$215,^ 50.00. /0//7VO CuFfrcTt^cT-
e. The contract price of $2,083,760.00 is based upon Customer 
providing materials and services which are listed in letter from K. 
Larson to R. Ham dated 10/16/8*1. Company will allow further agreed 
upon deductions if Customer can provide additional materials or 
services to Company. 
1 5 . M^R^lEjnNG^JS_UPPOK T 
Company to provide marketing s*ippcrl ar'.ii assistance to Customer tc 
I ncJ urie : 
. National Park Service presentation 
. Display dock and pictures for use in sales 
of slips 
. A color rendering of project to be used 
for promotion and sales 
. Reasonable on-site assistance and training 
to arslst Customer in meeting their marketing 
objectives . 
1 6. ilT^Lm^^liS^IGN 
Company agrees to prlvlde complete utility designs and 
specifications to Customer for its use In Request Irv, quotations. 
Company agrees to cooperation with utility contractor In expediting 
-8-
utllity installation. 
GENERAL CONDITIOMS 
Marinas Internationale is herein known as COMPANY and/or CONTRACTOR. 
Forever Resorts is herein known as CUSTOMER and/or OWNER. 
17. CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
The Contract Documents consist of this Agreement with General 
Conditions, Supplementary and other Conditions, the Drawings, the 
Specifications, accepted alternates and all Modifications after 
execution of the Contract such as Change Orders, written 
interpretations and written orders for minor changes in the Work. The 
intent of the Contract Documents is to include all items necessary for 
the proper execution and completion of the Work. The Contract 
Documents are complementary, and what: is required by any one shall be 
as binding as If required by all. Work not covered in the Contract 
Documents will not be required unless it is consistent therewith and 
reasonably inferable therefrom as being necessary to produce the 
intended results. 
17.1 Execution of the Contract by the Company is a representation that 
the Company has visited the site and is familiar with the local 
conditions under which the Work is to be performed. 
17.2 The Work comprises the completed construction required by the 
Contract Documents and Includes all labor necessary to produce such 
construction, and all materials and equipment Incorporated or to be 
Incorporated In such construction. 
-9-
18. CUSTOMER 
If the Company fails to correct defective Work or persistently 
fails to carry out the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents, 
the Owner, by a written order, may order the Company to stop the Work, 
or any portion thereof, until the cause for sucn order has been 
eliminated; however, this right of the Customer to stop the Work shall 
not give rise to any duty on the part of the Owner to exercise this 
right for the benefit of the Contractor or any other person or entity. 
19. COMPANY 
The Company shall supervise_and direct the Work, using the 
ucmpdny's best skill and attention, and ttt$ Company shall be^solelyt* 
responsible for all construction means, methods, techniques, sequences 
and procedures and for coordinating all bcfirtions of the Work under the 
[Contract. \ 
19.1 Unless otherwise specifically provided in the Contract Documents, 
the Company shall provide and pay for all labor, materials, equipment, 
tools, construction equipment and machinery, water, heat, utilities, 
transportation, and other facilities and service:: necessary for the 
proper execution and completion of the Work, whether temporary or 
permanent and whether or not Incorporated or to be incorporated in the 
Work . 
19.2 The Company shall at all times enforce strict discipline and gooc 
i 
order among the Company's employees and aha!1 not employ on the^WoMc,'*\ 
-10-
19.3 The Company warrants to the Customer that all materials and 
equipment incorporated in the Work will be new unless otherwise 
specified, and that all Work will be of good quality, free from faults 
and defects and in conformance with the Contract Documents•! .All Work 1 
not conforming to these requirements may be"considered defective. 
19^ The Company shall give all notices and comply with all laws, 
ordinances, rules, regulations, and lawful orders of any public 
authority bearirg on the performance of the Work, and shall promptly 
notify the Owner if the Drawings and Specifications are at variance 
therewith . 
19.5 The Company shall be responsible to'.the Customer for the acts and 
omissions of the Company's employees, Subcontractors and their agents 
and employees, and other persons performing any of the Work under a 
•contract with the Company. 
19.6 The Company shall review, approve and submit all Shop Drawings, 
Product Data and Samples required by the Contract Documents, The Work 
shall be in accordance with approved submittals. 
19.7 The Contractor at all times shall keep the premises free from 
accumulation of waste materials or rubbish causal by the .Company's 
operations* At the completion of the Work the Company shall remove all 
such waste materials and rubbish from and about the Project as well as 
the Company's tools, construction equipment, machinery and surplus 
materials. 
19.8 The Company shall pay ail royalties ;and license fees; shall/ 
defend all suits or claims for Infringement of any patent rights and 
-11-
shall save the Owner harmless from loss on ^ account thereof. 
19.9 To the fullest extent permitted by./lfiy,
 vthe Company shall 
indemnify and hold harmless the Customer^ and(' his agents and employees 
.from and_against all claims, damages, losses1and expenses, including , 
but not limited to attorney's fees arlsing^out of or resulting from the 
performance of the Work, provided that anv/,>such claim, damage, loss or 
expense (1) is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease or s 
death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than 
the Work^ltself) Including the loss of use^-'resuiting therefrom, and (2) 
is caused in whole or In part by any negligent act or omission of the 
Company, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by 
any of them or anyone for whose acts any of them may be liable. Such 
obligation shall not be construed to negate, abridge, or otherwise 
reduce any other right or obligation of indemnity which would otherwise 
exist as to any party or person described ,in this paragraph 19.9 in any 
and all claims against the Customer or any' of his agents or employees 
by any employee of the Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly _ 
or indirectly employed by any of them or anyone for whose acts any of 
them may be liable, the indemnification obligation under this Paragraph 
19.9 shall not be limited in any way by any limitation on the amount or 
type of damages, compensation or benefitsjv.p&yable by or for the 
Contractor or any Subcontractor under Workers1 or Workmen's 
Compensation Acts, disability benefit acts
 v< or other employee benefit 
acts. ' 
19.10 Company to accept responsibility for wages, workman's 
-12-
compensation, insurance, etc. as necessary for all personnel it 
employees while performing assembly and installation. Customer agrees 
to cooperate, if possible and without risk, to any assistance to 
company it can provide relative to conforming with State of Nevada 
contract and labor requirements. 
20. SUBCONTRACTS 
A Subcontractor is a person" or entity-who has a direct contract \* 
with .the Contractor to perform any of. theuWork at the site./ 
V . . . . < • , ' •,' • . . - • • , . . ! 
20.1 Unless otherwise required by the Contract Documents or in the 
Bidding Documents., the Contractor, as soon as practicable after the 
award of the Contract, shall furnish to the Owner in writing the names 
of Subcontractors for each of the principal portions of the Work. The 
Contractor shall not employ any Subcontractor to whom the Owner may 
have a reasonable objection. The Contractor shall not be required to 
contract with anyone to whom the Contractor has a reasonable objection. 
Contracts between the Contractor and the Subcontractors shall (1) 
require each Subcontractor, to the extent^of1. the Work to be perranmed 
pby the Subcontractor, to be bound to,the.:Cpii.tractor. by the terras of_the^ 
'-'- . . . . . . . » . . - • . ......... 
."Contract Documents, and to assume toward;^h$: Contractor all ..the 
jobllgations and responsibilities which'the/Contractor, by these .':: 
Documents, assumes toward the Owner, and. ^ ^allow to the Subcontractor 
the .benefit, of all rights, remedies 'andV^dress' afforded to the 
Contractqr_by_these Contract.Documents.} 
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21. WORK BY CUSTOMER Oft BY SEPARATE CONTRACTORS 
The Customer reserves the right to perform work related to the 
Project with the Customer's own forces, and to award separate contracts 
In connection with other portions of the Project or other work on the 
site under these or similar Conditions of the Contract. 
21.1 The Company shall afford the Customer and separate contractors 
reasonable opportunity for the introduction and storage of their 
materials and equipment and the execution of their work, and shall 
connect and coordinate the Contractor's Work under this Contract with 
theirs as required by the Contract Documents. 
21.2 Any costs caused by defective or ill-timed work shall be borne by 
the party responsible therefor. 
22, MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
The Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the 
Project is located. 
?3. PAYMENTS AND COMPLETION 
Payments shall be made as provided in *4 . of the Agreement* 
/23.1 Paymen?s<ma^be withheld on account oV (1) defective Work not: 
remedied, (2) claims filed, (3) failure of the Contractor to make 
payments properly to Subcontractors or for labor, materials or 
equipment, (4) damage to the Owner or another contractor, or (5) 
persistent failure to carry out the Work iri accordance with the 
Contract Documents, j 
?3.? Pinal payment shall not be due until the Contractor has delivere 
to the Owner a complete release of all liens arising out of this ' 
-14-
'Contract or receipts in full covering all'Vl'abor, materials and 
• equipment for, which a lien could be filed^r a bond satisfactory to 
,
lthe Owner indemnifying the Owner against ,any lien. /If any lien remains 
'unsatlsified after all .payments :are'made/Pt-he; Company shall refund to 
the Customer^all monies the latter may ,be ..compelled to pay in 
discharging such lien, including &\V costs-ifand reasonable, attorney' s -
fees. , • 
23.3 The making of final payment shall constitute a waiver of all 
claims by the Customer except those arising from (1) unsettled liens, 
(2) faulty or defective Work appearing after Substantial Completion, 
(3) failure of the Work to comply with the requirements of the Contract 
Documents, or (4) terms of any special warranties required by the 
Contract Documents. The acceptance of final payment shall constitute a 
waiver of all claims by the Contractor except those previously made in 
writing and identified by the Contractor as unsettled at the time of 
the final Application for Payment. 
2H. PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY 
The Company shall be responsible for*, initiating, maintaining, and 
supervising all safety precautions and programs in connection with the 
Work.f The Company shall takcall reasonable precautions for the safety 
of, and shall provide all reasonable protection to prevent damage, »* 
Injury or loss to (1) all employees on th(? Work and other persons who 
may be affected thereby, (2) all the Work^pnd all materials and 
equipment to be incorporated therein, and/(3) other property at the 
site or adjacent thereto. The Company shall give all notices and 
- 1 5 -
~comply w^th_appllcable laws, 'ordinances, "rules, regulations and orders 
of any publlc^authority bearing on the,safety of persons and property^ 
.and their protection from damage^ Injury [or. loss• The Contractor shal 
promptly remedy all damage or lo.ss to any 'property caused in whole orj 
4in part by the Contractor, any Subcontractor, and Sub-sub-contractor, 
or anyone directly, or by anyone^ for ^ whos,^ acts any of thera may be , v 
liable,'except damage or loss attributable to the acts or omissions of 
the Owner or anyone directly employed by^im or by anyone for whose * " 
acts either^of them may be liable, and not attributable^ to the fault o 
negligence of the Contractors. 
2 'I • C_HA_NG_ES_ IN THE_ _WOR_K 
The Owner, without invalidating the Contract, may order changes 1 
the Work consisting of additions, deletions, or modifications, the 
Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, and the Contract Time being adjusted 
accordingly. All such changes in the Work shall be authorized by 
written Change Order signed by the Owner, 
2*4.1 The Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, and the Contract Time may b 
changed only by Change Order. 
2*4.2 The cost or credit to the Owner from a change in the Work shall 
be determined by mutual agreement. 
25- TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT 
If the Contractor defaults or persistently falls or neglects to 
carry out the Work In accordance with the Contract Documents or falls 
to perform any provision of the Contract, the Owner (may, after 30 day1 
writen notice to the Contractor, make good such deficiencies and may 
-16-
deduct the cost thereof from the payment then or thereafter due the 
Contractor or, at the Owner1s option that sufficient cause exists to 
Justify such action, may terminate the Contract and take possession of 
the site and of all materials, equipment, tools, and construction 
equipment and machinery thereon owned by the Contractor and may finish 
the Work by whatever method the Owner may deem expedient; and if the 
unpaid balance of the Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, exceeds the 
expense of finishing the Work, such excess shall be paid to the 
Contractor, but if such expense exceeds such unpaid balance, the 
Contractor shall pay the difference to the Owner, 
26. ACCOUNTING RECORDS 
The Contractor shall check all materials, equipment and labor 
entering into the anchor/winch system and shall keep such full and 
detailed accounts as may be necessary for proper financial management 
under this Agreement. The Owner shall be afforded access to all the 
Contractor's records relating to this anchor/winch system. 
27. SPECIFICATIONS 
Company agrees to provide all materials In accordance with its 
published materials specifications sheet, copy attached. 
28. ENTIRE CONTRACT 
This Contract, Including the SALES CONTRACT SUPPLEMENT where 
applicable, constitutes the entire Contract between the Customer and 
the Company regarding the purchase of the marina materials noted above. 
This contract supercedes any prior written or oral agreements. This 
Contract may only be amended by a written Instrument executed by both 
parties. 
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Marlnas International^?, Ltd. 
Date : 
C u s t om eVCALL/JLLF AA\Z 0A/VVtf 
. / > / / j 
Date 
Customer warrants that the 
specifications and marina plan have 
been approved and are herewith 
attachedl 
m-
(initial) 
mmmmMsmmm 
ADDENDUM # 1 
DURA-TREET'STRUCTURAL LUMBER 
THIRTY-YEAR LIMITED WARRANTY CERTIFICATE 
DURA-TREET* STRUCTURAL LUMBER when used for the construction of home, farm or 
light industrial structures carries with its purchase a warranty for thirty 
years from the date of purchase which covers damage by termites or decay 
that would make the lumber structurally unfit for the application for which it 
was used. Should the lumber fail for one of the preceding reasons, the 
orininal purchaser will be entitled to receive new DURA-TREET* STRUCTURAL 
LUMBER on a pro-rated basis in exchange for the termite or decay damaged 
lumber. To make arrangements for this exchange, the original purchaser must 
send the original purchase invoice showing the^date of purchase, the name of 
the treater, the name of the inspection agency, and showing that sufficient 
DURA-TREET* STRUCTURAL LUMBER has been purchased to cover the number of board 
feet claimed to be damaged, to: 
DURA-TREET'STRUCTUUAL LUMHKK 
IDACON, INC. 
10611 HARWIN DRIVE, SUITE 400 
HOUSTON , TEXAS 77036 
Warrantor shall not be liable hereunder for damage to UURA-lRFrT1 STRUCTURA! 
1 UMBER used in foundation systems, in water immersion applications, in unusual 
soil conditions, or for uses other than in home, farm, or light industrial 
applications, warrantor shall not be responsible for damage from any cause 
other than termites or decay. Warrantor shall not be liable for any installation 
or reinstallation costs, or the natural characteristics of some wood to check, 
warp, or twist, or for any incidental or consequential damages, and warrantor 
shall have no further liabilities or obligations hereunder, except as expressly 
stated herein. Nothing in this limited warranty is intended to, or shall change 
the duration of any warranties express or implied, or shall give purchaser any 
express or implied warranties he would not otherwise have, extend either beyond 
their customary duration, or make warrantor liable for any express or implied 
warranties that it would not be liable for if tins limited warranty had not been 
given* 
Since some states have not recognized the limitation of implied warranties, 
the above period of duration and/or limitation of incidental and consequential 
damages may not apply to your purchase and may give you rights in addition 
to the specific legal rights granted herein. 
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ADDENDUM #2 
CONTRACTOR'S PROJECTED ANCHORING COSTS 
50 A frames $420.00 $21,000.00 
Misc Shackles, blocks, clips 35,350.00 
50 Winches 650.00 32,500.00 
80 Anchors 375.00 30,000.00 
Additonal engineering 15,000.00 
Freight 8,500.00 
34,000' cable: 2.15 
15,000 static lines 32,250.00 
10,000 anchor lines UP ,850.00 
$215,450.00 
ADDENDUM 6 
Installation Contract between Marinas Internationale and 
Marina Mechanics (Trial Exhibit P-3) 
INSTALLATION CONTRACT /-•tee A^/cA/'f'I'r /$><-•/ 
This Agreement, made this 1st day of March, in the year 
Nineteen Hundred and 85, by and between Marinas Internationale, 
Ltd-, hereinafter called the Contractor, and Marina Mechanics 
Ent., hereinafter called the Subcontractor. 
Witnesseth, that the Contractor and Subcontractor for the 
consideration hereinafter named aaree as follows: 
ARTICLE 1. The Subcontractor aarees to furnish all equip-
ment and perform all work for the installation of the floating 
docks for the Callville Day Marina in accordance with the 
General Conditions of the Contract between the Owner and the 
Contractor and in accordance with the Drawings and Specifications 
prepared by Marinas Internationale, Ltd., all of which Drawings 
and Specifications, signed by the parties hereto form a part 
of a Contract between the Contractor and the Owner and hereby 
become a part of this contract. 
ARTICLE 2. The Subcontractor and the Contractor aaree that 
the work to be done is as follows: 
Marinas Internationale will deliver all parts and components 
to the job site by Callville Bay. Marina Mechanics Ent. is to 
provide labor for the foaming (Dick Wyke will machine fill each 
pontoon) of the pontoons, assemble the docks, complete with all 
hardware, float them in place and temporarily anchor them so they 
'are*protected from damage. 
ARTICLE 3. The Subcontractor aarees to complete the several 
portions and the whole of the work herein sublet as required by 
the Contractor and the Owners. This work is to be completed in 
a reasonable period of time. Callville Bay is to be installed by 
May 31, 1985. Two shifts may be necessary to accomplish this. 
ARTICLE 4. The Contractor aarees to pay the Subcontractor 
for the performance of his work the sum of $150,696 which is based 
on 86,112 square feet of deck area times SI.75 per square foot. 
INSTALLATION CONTRACT Page 2 
$20,000 will be paid in advance for mobilization and acceptance 
of this contract, 
ARTICLE 5, The Contractor and Subcontractor agree to be 
bound by the terms of the Agreement, the General Conditions, 
Drawings and Specifications as far as applicable to this sub-
contract, and also by the following provisions: 
The Subcontractor agrees -
(a) To be bound to the Contractor by the terms of the 
the Agreement, General Conditions of the Contract, the Drawings 
and Specifications, and to assume toward him all the obligation: 
and responsibilities that he, by those documents, assumes 
toward the Owner. 
(b) To submit to the Contractor applications for payment 
in such reasonable time as to enable the Contractor to apply fox 
payment* 
(c) Marina Mechanics Ent. is to provide sufficient insuran 
including workmen's compensation insurance, libility insurance, 
etc., to hold Marinas Internationale, Ltd. free and clear of 
all claims or damages until the dock units have been accepted 
by the using agent. Marina Mechanics Ent. will be responsible 
for any damages arising out of the contract work performed by 
Marina Mechanics Ent. All work is to be completed in a good 
workmanship manner and Marina Mechanics will clean up all work 
areas and leave them in the condition they were in at the time 
*of this contract. 
The Contractor agrees -
(d) To be bound to the Subcontractor by all the obligations 
that the Owner assumes to the Contractor under the Agreement, 
General Conditions of the Contract, the Drawings and Specifica-
tions. 
(e) To pay the Subcontractor the amount allowed to the 
Contractor on amount of the Subcontractor's work to the extent 
of the Subcontractor's interest therein. 
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(f) To pay the Subcontractor so that at all times his 
total payments shall be as large in proportion to the value 
of the work done by him as the total amount certified to the 
Contractor is to the value of the work done by him. 
(g) To make no demand for liquated damages or penalty 
for delay in any sum in excess of such amount as may be speci-
fically named in the subcontract. 
(h) To give the Subcontractor an opprotunity to be 
present and to submit evidence in any arbitration involving 
his rights. 
The Contractor and the Subcontractor agree that -
(i) In the matter of arbitration, their rights and obli-
gations and all procedure shall be analogous to those set forth 
in this contract. I 
Nothing in this article shall create any obligation on the 
part of the Owner to pay or to see the payment of any sums to ^  
any Subcontractor. 
In Witness Whereof, the parties hereto nave executed this 
Agreement, the day and year first abc 2 written. 
J, 
Thomas T. Allgyer 
Executive Vice!President 
Marinas Internationale, Ltd. 
<J 
Ron Nielson" / 
President / 
Marina Mechanics Ent, 
MARINAS INTERNATIONALE, LTD. 
Contractor 
APPENDIX 
1. THE WORK 
In general, floating docks and components shall be furnished 
by Marinas and delivered to the 30b site. Contractor shall off-
load same, store them and assume responsibility for their securi 
The Subcontractor shall not install the anchor system, but shall 
suoply all labor, tools and eauipment requirea to assemble and 
temporarily anchor docks so they will not be damaged. Subcon-
tractor shall assemble floating docks in conformity with spec-
ifications and drawings provided by the office of Marinas at 
380 Herndon Parkway, Suite 1900, Herndon, VA 22070. 
-11 ^ork under this contract, other than of floating dcc<s com-
ponents furnished by Marinas, shall be performed strictly in 
accordance with the specifications and drawings supplied by 
Marinas unless otherwise agreed in writing. 
Should the Subcontractor determine that variance exists oetween 
these specifications and drawings and the actual site conditions, 
this information shall be furnished to Marinas immediately upcn 
discovering that sucn a variance exists. 
Construction specifications are as follows: 
(1) All butt joints to be tight fittmc with gaps not to exceed 
1/8". 
(2) All plank to be stored in a manner that will not cause twist 
mg . 
(3) All bolts holes to be drilled straight, so as to not cause 
the bolt head to be drawn at an angle into the surface of 
the wood. All bolts should be drawn down tightly, but not 
too tight so as to cause them to dig into the wood. 
(4) All exterior of pontoon scraped clean of excess urethane. 
(5) All gouqes in wood caused from handling to be repaired 
with wood filler. 
(6) All the surface of the docks to be coated with a wood sealer 
provided for by Marinas. Special emphasis should oe made on 
any wood that has been drilled or cut after pressure treatmer 
(7) Cut off extra foam from pontoon low enouah that the pontocn, 
when laqgea to the underneath side of the decking, will be a 
tight fit around the eages. 
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(8) When stapling on dock fender, it must be pressed tightly 
against the edge of the dock. When stapling fender on, 
the ain pressure must be regulated such that the top end of 
the staple does not penetrate through the lip of the fender, 
eliminating fender power. Installer shall stretch the dock 
fender before stapling to prevent sagging. All dock fender 
should be stapled on the top and bottom on 3" centers. 
2. TIME FOR COMPLETION 
The Work shall beqin upon signing of this Agreement and shall 
be completed by May 31, 1985. 
3. CONSTRUCTION MANAGER 
Bill Graham shall act as representative of Marinas Interna-
tionale and shall supervise the progress and performance of 
the Work in Marinas' behalf. Construction Manager shall at 
all times have access to the worksite and to any portion of 
the Work being performed hereunder. 
4. USE OF WORKSITE 
Subcontractor shall confine its operations at the worksite 
to areas permitted by law, ordinances, permits and the Contract 
Documents and shall not unreasonably encumber the site with 
any materials or equipment. The Subcontractor shall take the 
necessary precautions to protect all properties from damage 
and shall leave the property in a condition at least equiva-
lent to the condition found. 
5. CLEANING UP 
Subcontractor shall at all times keep the worksite and 
surrounding premises free from accuiulation of waste materials 
or rubbish caused by its operations, such as, for example, 
urethane foam residues. On completion of the Work, Sub-
contractor shall remove all waste materials and rubbish from 
and abount the worksite, as well as all tools, construction 
equipment, machinery and surplus materials, and shall leave 
same "broom-clean" or equivalent. If subcontractor fails to 
clean up, Marinas may do so and charge the cost thereof to 
Subcontractor. 
6. SAFETY OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY 
Subcontractor shall take all reasonable precautions for the 
safety of, and shall provide all reasonable protection to 
prevent damage, injury or loss to: 
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(a) All employees on or about the worksite and all other 
persons who may be affected thereby; 
(b) The Work and all materials and equipment to be incorp-
orated therin, whether in storage on or off the work-
site, under the care, custody or control of the Contra 
or any Subcontractor; and; 
(c) Other property on or about the worksite, including tre 
shrubs, lawns, walks, pavements, roadways, structures 
and utilities. 
Subcontractor shall comply with all applicable laws, ordinances, 
rules, regulations and orders of any public authority having 
jurisdiction for the safety of person or property and shall erec 
and maintain, as recuired by existing conditions and progress of 
the Work, all reasonable safeguards for safety and protection, 
including posting danger signs and other warnings against hazard* 
7. ASSIGNMENTS 
Subcontractor shall not assian this Contract or any of its 
interests hereunder, nor shall this contract be assigned 
or transferred by operation of law, or by any process or 
proceeding of any court, or otherwise, without the consent 
of Marinas being first obtained. If subcontractor is a 
corporation, then any merger, consolidation or liquidation 
to which Subcontractor is a party, or any change in the owne 
ship of or power to vote the majority of Subcontractor's 
controlling stock, shall constitue an assingment for purpose 
of the Contract. Subcontractor cannot subcontract without 
prior written authorization. 
8. Written notice under this Contract may be delivered or 
mailed. If delivered, they shall be delivered in person 
to Subcontractor or an authorized representative thereof. 
If mailed, they shall be sent certifeid or registerd mail 
to the parties*at the following address or to such other 
address as either party may hereafter designate in writing 
to the other party. 
To Marinas: Marinas Internationale, Ltd. 
380 Herndon Parkway, Suite 1900 
Herndon, Virginia 22070 
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To Subcontractor: Marina Mechanics Ent. 
c/o Ron Neilson 
8537 Scottish Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
9. ARBITRATION 
Should any dispute arise out of the interpretation, construc-
tion or performance of this purchase order if the same is 
accepted, such dispute as a condition prior to any litigation 
shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the then 
existing Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Assoc-
iation. Buyer retains generally all right and remedies 
granted to it by operation of law in addition to those set 
forth herein. 
1B1-71^ 
CONTRACT AMENDMENT U 
This following agreement was made this day of March 28, in 
the year nineteen hundred and 85, by and between Marinas 
Internationale, Ltd. and Marina Mechanics, Ent. 
Article 1. Marina Mechanics, Ent. agrees to fabricate the 
following anchor blocks per detailed drawings: 
Description 3 of Anchors 
Large Anchors 144 
Ancnors 27 
Cost Per Anchor 
$268.00 
97.00 
TOTAL 
Total Cost 
38,592.00 
2,619.00 
$41,211.00 
Article 2. Marina Mechanics, Ent. agrees to provide 
Marinas Internationale, Ltd. a credit of 
$3,001.20 (410 man hours at S7.32 per hour) 
if Marinas Internationale, Ltd. provides the 
laborers needed for fabrication. 
Article 3. Estimated time of completion of these anchors 
is 17 days based on 3 men working 8 hours per 
day. 
Article 4. Marinas Internationale, Ltd. agrees to pay 
progressive payments as work is completed and 
invoiced. 
J L . r >i. 
Thomas T. Allgj^r 
Executive Vice(President 
Marinas Internationale, Ltd, 
Ron Nielsor 
President 
Marina Mechanics, Ent, 
'7, luc ,t L :;y 2-5c )>> 
Date Date 
ADDENDUM 7 
Payment Requests 1-6 (Trial Exhibits P-12, 16, 20, 21, 24 and 25) 
8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE 
SANDY, UTAH 84092 
(801)942-1832 
UEST FOR PAYMENT .£ I 
MARINAS INTERNATIONALE LTD. 
| Herndor. Parkvay 
ndon, Virginia 22070 
N: Tom Allgyer 
DATE: 3-13-85 
RI: Job #A101-KEV, 
.tract Reference: Callvi l le Bay Marina/UWe head, Nevada 
LK ASSEMBLY BASI CONTRACT: 
Slf ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT: 
SHORING CONTRACT: 
ANGE ORDERS TO D*TE: 
TnL CONTRACT TO DATE: 
150,696.00 
30li, 900.00 
(FENDING) 
-0-
155,596.00 
MOBILIZATION 
ital Contract to Date 20,000.00 
% Work Complete 20,000.00 
-t Invoice to Date 2°>0 0 0-°° 
i « Previous Bil l ing (PD) 120,000-002 
ie This Invoice -0-
MnTERlAL 
210.300.00 
103,329.00 
103,329.00 
( -0 - ) 
103,329.00 
U&jh TuTni-
195,296.00 155,596.00 
U,237.00 127,566.00 
h,237.00 127,566.00 
( -0 - ) ( 20,000.00) 
I,237.00 $107,566.00 
Authorized Signature, hfrrftL 
feke Check Payable to : Marina Mechanics Ent. 
WITNESS:- \>\?\\;u\ 
CAROLYNISUUJVAN CSR/RPR 
•MM 
8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE 
SANDY, UTAH 84092 
(801) 942-1832 
RECUEST FOR PAYMENT #2 
TO: MAR3NAS INTERNATIONALE LTD. 
3P0 Herndon Parkway 
Herndon, Virginia 22070 
ATTN: Ton Allayer 
Date: 3-?5-85 
RE: Job #A101-Mev. 
Contract reference: C a l l v i l l e Bay Marina/Lake Mead, Nevada 
DOCK ASSEMBLY BASZ CJNTEACT: 
ROOF ASSEK5LY BASE CONTRACT: 
ANCHORING CONTRACT: 
CHANGE ORDERS TO IUTE: (SEE ATTACH.) 
TOT^ L CONTRACT TO *%TE: 
150,696.00 
30ii,90C.CO 
(PENDING) 
1,1148.02 
1*56,71:1:. 02 
ffiSILIZATIJi' 
Base contract to Date 20,000.00 
Jhange orders to Date (a t tach) ( -0 - ) 
Total Contract to Date 20,000.00 
36% Work Complete 20,000.00 
Net Invoice to Date 20,000.00 
Less Previous Request (20,000.00) 
Pue This Invoice - 0 -
MATir.lAi 
21:0,300.00 
(-0-) 
21*0,300.00 
103,329.00 
103,329.00 
(103,329.00) 
Authorized Signature, 
Make Check Payable t o : Marina Mechanics Ent. 
S incere ly , 
MA&Si* MECHANICS ENT. 
jnald K. Keilso* 
Owner 
F.KN/sn 
Enclosure 
LABOR 
195,296.00 
1,11*8.02 
196,Uhh.02 
1:1,098.61 
TOT* I 
1:55,596.CO 
1,11:8.02 
1:56,71:1:.02 
16L,L27.£L 
i l l , 098.8L 161:, 1:27.81: 
( It,237.00) (127,566.00) 
36,861.81* I 36,86l.«h 
;•? >2 
i) 
•JZ0«i 
V 
L/ 
8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE 
SANDY, UTAH 84092 
(801) 942-1832 
BS:UESr FOR P.-.Y.MEJ.'T J 3 
TO: MnP.EIAS INTERNATIONALE LTD. 
3ti0 Herndon parkway 
Herndon, V i rg in i a 22070 
ATTII: Ton; Allgyer 
Date h-29-85 
RE: Job #rt101-Nev. 
Cont rac t r e f e r e n c e : C a l l v i l l e Bay Marina/Lake Keaa, f/evscs 
DOCK ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT: 
ROOF ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT: 
AIXiiORr.'o 2«JE CONTRACT: 
AMENDMENT n (CONCRETE ANCHOR SLOCKS] 
flrtCK CHARGES TO DATE: 
TOTAL CONTRACT TO D*TE: 
$150,696.00 
301,900.00 
62,c'60.CC 
1,11*3.02 
3557,013.02 
Dock Assexoly 
Roof Asseraoly 
Anchoring 
Amendment #1 
Eack Charges 
T o t a l Cont rac t t o Date: 
Work Complete t o Date. 
Net Invoice to Date 
Less Prev ious Requests 
Due Th i s Invoice 
MOBILIZATION 
20,000.00 
- 0 -
10,000.00 
5,000.00 
- 0 -
35,000.00 
35,000.00 
35,coo.co 
(20,000.00) 
MATERIAL 
ii l ,5i i6.oo 
2hO,30CCO 
17,860.00 
30,709.30 
- 0 -
360,1*15.00 
139,872.00 
139,872.00 
(119,081a.00) 
JAz 
89,150.00 
6^,600.00 
5,000.00 
2,500.00 
l ,Ui8 .02 
lo2,39«.02 
11*3,122.02 
13,122.02 
(33,1*82.0*0) 
cn~> 
Authorizated S igns tun 
Make Check Payable t o : Marina Mechanics Ent , 
S i n c e r e l y , 
P^_ 
^'157000.00. J V20Jfi8.0O- 9,6L0.02 
TOT.-vl 
150,696.00 
30li, 900.00 
62,860.00 
38,209.60 
1,11:0.02 
557,613.C2 
217,99ii.C2 
217,991.02 
(172,566.00) 
$ 15,125.02 
MAriDnPlMECHArilCS ENT 
Ronald K. l iei l 
Ovner 
RK>!/tIn 
8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE 
SANDY, UTAH 84092 
(801)942-1832 
REQUEST FOR PAYMENT itlx JDate 5-20-65 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ —— I 
TO: WkTTuxS INTERNATIDNALE LTD. RE: Job #A101-Nevada 
380 Herncon Parkway 
Herndon, Vi rg in ia 22070 
ATTN: Tom Allgyer 
Cont rac t r e f e r e n c e : C a l l v i l l e Bay Marina/Lake Mead, Nevada 
LOCK ^ L ^ L Y BACE CONTRACT: 
RDuF ASSEi-lbLY bASE CuNTIiJiCT: 
ANCHORING JASE Gu.! TRACT: 
AhOL.\i.T ffl JASE COMTUCT:( 
SACK CHnhJ^b To UTE: 
TOTAL CUNTRACT TO UTE: 
Dock Assembly 
Roof Asremcly 
Anchoring 
Amendment #1 
Back Charges 
T o t a l Contract to Date 
Work Comnlete to Date 
Net Invoice t o Date 
Less Previous Requests 
'/-.N'ChJK) 
MjrilLII^T:^,' 
20,000.00 
- 0 -
10,000.00 
5,000.00 
- 0 -
35,000.00 
35,000.00 
35,000.00 
35,000.00) 
$150,696.00 
30ii, 900.00 
101,530.00 
1x1,211.00 
li ,569.97 
§602,976.97 
1 
M^TLKLII, 
1x1,51x6.00 
21x0,300.00 
1^7,860.00 
30 ,70 , .80 
- 0 -
360,U5.tfo ; 
173,198.60 
173,198.60 
(139,672.00) ( 
L.j djR 
89,150.00 
61 ,600 .0J 
la3,720.CO 
5,501.20 
lx,589.97 
207,561.17 
68,581.17 
63,581.17 
: 1x3,122.02, 
ToT-^ L 
150,696.00 
OliO, 9C0.CC 
101,550.00 
1x1,211.00 
b,559.97 
602,976.97 
276,779.97 
276,779,97 
(217,99L.Q2) 
Due This Invoice - 0 - 33,326.80 25,1x59.15 S 58,785.95 
Enclosed p lease find breakaown of overtime cost for payr-oll. 
o» 
Make Check Payable t o : MARIN* MECHANICS, ENT. J<-<tC> ^^,°00'^ S/zzfgi 
S i n c e r e l y , 
MAREM^ MECHANICS ENT. 
<2 ~ir /,"• 
l°,0O6^ S'/S/Jti 
Ronald K. NeilsJ 
Owner 
RKN/gn 
Enclosure 
8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE 
SANDY, UTAH 84092 
(801) 942-1832 
REQUEST FOR PAYMENT US 
TO: MARINA'S INTERNATIONALE LTD. 
380 Herndon Parkway 
Herndon, V i r g i n i a 22070 
ATTN: Tom A l l g y e r 
Cont rac t Re: C a l l v i l l e Bay Mar ina /Lake Mead, Nevada 
DATE 6 -12 -85 
REt JOB 0A1O1-NEV 
DOCK ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT: 
ROOF ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT: 
ANCHORING BASE CONTRACT: 
AMENDMENT *1 BASE CONTRACT: (ANCHOR) 
BACK CHA:.CcS TO DATE: 
TOTAL CONTRACT TO DATE: 
MOBILIZATION 
Deck As-u.-nol., 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Roof Assemcly - 0 -
Anchoriruj 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Amendment n 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Backcharges - 0 -
T o t a l Cont rac t to Date 3 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Work Complete to Date 3 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Net I n v o i c e to Date 3 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Less Previous R e g u e s t s ( 3 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) 
Due t h i s I n v o i c e - 0 -
MATERIAL 
4 1 , 5 4 6 . 0 0 
2 4 0 , 3 0 0 . 0 0 
4 7 , 8 6 0 . 0 0 
3 0 , 7 0 9 . 8 0 
'
 4 4 , 5 6 9 . 6 0 
3 6 4 , 9 8 5 . 4 0 
1 9 8 , 6 9 8 . 4 0 
1 9 8 , 6 9 8 . 4 0 
( 1 7 3 , 1 9 8 . 8 0 ) 
2 5 , 4 9 9 . 6 0 
$ 1 5 0 , 6 9 6 . 0 0 
3 0 4 , 9 0 0 . 0 0 
1 0 1 , 5 8 0 . 0 0 
4 1 , 2 1 1 . 0 0 
2 8 , 6 8 6 . 1 5 
$627 ,073 .15 
LABOR 
8 9 , 1 5 0 . 0 0 
6 4 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 
4 3 , 7 2 0 . 0 0 
5 , 5 0 1 . 2 0 
2 4 , 1 1 6 . 5 5 
2 2 7 , 0 8 7 . 7 5 
152 ,627 .75 
1 5 2 , 6 2 7 . 7 5 
( 7 4 , 7 9 5 . 2 2 ) 
7 7 , 8 3 2 . 5 3 
TOTAL 
150,696. 
304,900. 
101,580. 
4 1 , 2 1 1 . 
28 ,686 , 
627 ,073. 
386 ,326 . 
386,326. 
( 2 8 2 , 9 9 4 . 
$103,332. 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.15 
,1b 
,15 
,15 
_02 
11 
Enclosed please f i n d breakdown o f o v e r t i m e cost on p a y r o l l 
Make check payable t o : MARINA MECHANICS, ENT. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
MARIN? MECHANICS ENT. 
'Ronald K. .'Jei'lsoh 
8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE 
SANDY, UTAH 84092 
(801)942-1832 
RECUEST FDR °AYMENT #6 D*tr : 6-12-35 
TO: MARINAS INTERNATIONALE LTD. RE: JOB #A101-N*v. 
i57A O r l i s l e Drivn 
Herndon, VA. 27070 
ATTEN: Tom Allgyer 
Contract R P : O l l v i l l c Eoy Marin*/]>.ke Mr*<i, Nevada 
DOCK ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT: Ji5O.696.OO 
ROOF ASSEMBLY BASF. CONTRACT: ?0£,900.00 
ANCHORING BASE CONTRACT: 101,580.00 
AMENDMENT #1 BASE CONTRACT: (ANCHOR) LI ,211.00 
SACKCHARGFS (TO 6-11-85) 7 / . , ^ . c - 9 
TOTAL CONTRACT TO DATE: *572,701 .59 
MOBILIZATION MATERIAL Labor Tot-1 
Dock Assembly 20,000.00 M , 5^6.00 89,130.00 130,696.00 
Ro->f Assrnbly - 0 - 2 /0 ,300.00 hi ,600.00 *>0/ ,900.00 
Anchoring 10,000.00 17,300.00 /3 ,720.00 1 0l ,900 .00 
Amendment-?1 5,000.00 ' '0 ,709.00 5,501.20 n , ? i i . 0 0 
•Jnckchprgrs ^ I P ^ Q P J O 6?,01?.19 7/ . ^ U . ' P 
To t s l Contract to Drtp ?5,000.00 372,7 13.70 ? 6 i , 9 S c . , 9 672,701. 9 
Work Comnlrtr to D.-tr ^5,000.00 ^07,/3.2.70 190,523.^9 5°2,975.59 
Nrt Invoicp to Date 35,000.00 °07,/-57.20 190,37 / , . ' ,9 3°2,975.59 
Less Previous Pnymcnts(^5,000.00) (173,198.80) (7/.,795.27) (737,99/.Q?) 
Dur This Invoicr - 0 - 1°/,?r/>.,A0 115,72S.17 2 / 9 , 7 9 / . 37 
M-kp Chrck o.-v:>blc t o : MARINA MECHANICS ENT. 
S i n c p r r l y , 
MARIN/ UECFIANICSTJT. 
I n-uUAj.'M-^ 
Owner 
R O / m 
ADDENDUM 8 
Accommodation Agreement between FLP and Marina Mechanics 
dated July 4, 1985. (Trial Exhibit P-32) 
8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE 
SANDY, UTAH 84092 
h July 1985 
Richard Ham 
TATIVILLE BAY hi .'H'J 6 MJHtlJ 
LUJ 100 Star K uLi.. 1L 
Lds Vegas, Nevada 8°12ij 
RE: Weekly Est imated Cost for Labor and Equipment t o complete C a l l v i l l e bay Marina 
i d iscussed in meeting with Ten H±cr, Rich ham id Ron an1 " n l l i p N P I 1 ^ - ' - , TT 
Ml i , 19PC . 
&12,OOQ.OO - 15,0GC.0u 
t ) t q m p n e n t Cont j/ujency 
10L CiK Compressor 
CV 150 F o r k l i f t 
j&ochor Bar^e 
Gennrator 
j t U , L 
Ja95^o 
85o#oo 
6oo.ro 
230.( 0 
2,675,00 
Fool ft Repair E t c . 
5) Subs i s t ence , Off ice Overhead 
lood 
Phone 
Auto 
I n s m 
5 ) Salary 
R e s p e c t f u l l y SuDiuiiiteQp 
L MECHANIC, MfK 
Ronald k. N^il4on 
Owner 
1 0 0 , XJ 
?5.oo 
2I10.00 
100.00 
125.00 
6ii0. io ouu.uu 
1.150.00 
$17,690.00- 20,690.00 
CER'iii k':.^  ji IIA: ^ -DELIVERY 
I hereby cert- , 's"u *~r •-
1988, tru- and correct copies ci L..« :.,:C:^I:. 
Respona- *- * ; rioducti, ^nc., were 
delivere.: :•• tnt- L W U ^ ^ L I : 
".ary Ferrero, Esq, 
Attorney for Appellant 
Ronald K. Neilsen, dba 
Marina Mechanics Enter: rises 
7 060 South Union Park. Avenue 
Suite 570 
P. 0. Box 7005 
SLC\ UT 8 4107 
J, Ra^ burr:c:, : . 
Attorney for Appellant 
Astro Steel Corp, 
MUELLER, BARRIOS & CHRISTIANSEN 
777 Clark Learning Center 
175 South West TCTT.V ! e 
SLC, TT^ P4101 
